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PLEADING THE FIFTH  
IN IMMIGRATION COURT:  
A REGULATORY PROPOSAL 
TANIA N. VALDEZ* 
ABSTRACT 
Protections of noncitizens’ rights in immigration removal proceedings 
have remained minimal even as immigration enforcement has exponentially 
increased. An overlooked, but commonplace, problem in immigration court 
is the treatment of the constitutional right against self-incrimination. Two 
routine scenarios occur where noncitizens are asked to sacrifice their right 
against self-incrimination in immigration court. One involves testimony 
regarding conduct related to immigration status that may lead to 
prosecution for federal immigration violations, such as illegal entry, illegal 
reentry, or alien smuggling. The other involves testimony regarding any 
other potentially criminal activity, including when the noncitizen currently 
has pending charges in criminal court yet is expected to testify about the 
underlying facts of the case during immigration court proceedings. In both 
of these circumstances, the immigration system puts noncitizens in the 
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untenable position where they must either elect to waive the constitutional 
right not to self-incriminate and testify regardless of possible criminal 
consequences, or exercise their right to silence and risk the immigration 
judge drawing an adverse inference that could result in deportation.  
The skewed incorporation of criminal norms into the immigration 
arena—a supposedly civil system—without a simultaneous expansion of 
procedures designed to protect and enforce noncitizens’ rights leads to 
disastrous results. Moreover, the lack of procedural fairness in removal 
proceedings exaggerates the imbalance of power between the federal 
government, with its immense resources, and the individuals it seeks to 
deport. Considering the broad powers granted to the executive and 
legislative branches of government to regulate immigration, and the 
attendant limited oversight by Article III courts, the courts are not likely to 
provide the most efficient or far-reaching solution. Thus, this Article posits 
that, rather than utilizing the traditional judicial avenue for vindicating 
constitutional rights, federal agency regulatory rulemaking is the best way 
forward. The Article then offers proposed regulatory language that is 
intended to provide a meaningful procedural vehicle through which 
noncitizens’ right against self-incrimination may be enforced. The proposed 
regulations provide that immigration judges must advise noncitizens of their 
right to remain silent, prohibit judges from drawing an adverse inference 
where noncitizens have pending criminal charges, clarify the procedures 
that must be followed in order to compel speech, and limit the government’s 
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Though deportation is not technically a criminal proceeding, it visits 
a great hardship on the individual and deprives him of the right to 
stay and live and work in this land of freedom. That deportation is a 
penalty—at times a most serious one—cannot be doubted. Meticulous 
care must be exercised lest the procedure by which he is deprived of 
that liberty not meet the essential standards of fairness.1 
The Fifth Amendment provides: “No person . . . shall be compelled in 
any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”2 This negative right is 
alternately described as the right not to be compelled to be a witness against 
oneself,3 the right to remain silent,4 the right against self-incrimination,5 or 
the privilege against self-incrimination.6 This Article examines the extent to 
which the right has been deemed to apply in the context of removal 
proceedings. It argues that this constitutional protection should be more 
fully available—with some nuances—to noncitizens facing removal, due to 
the increasingly intertwined nature of criminal and immigration law.7  
At the time the Bill of Rights was written, immigration control was not 
yet a widely accepted, or agreed-upon, concept.8 Over time, the Supreme 
Court of the United States developed a theory that the power to exclude or 
expel was part of a nation’s inherent sovereign rights. Thus, the Court 
endorsed the idea that Congress has the power to determine who is permitted 
to enter or remain within the United States, and immigration is therefore 
considered a system of civil regulation. On those grounds, federal courts 
 
1. Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 154 (1945). 
2. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
3. Id. 
4. Albert W. Alschuler, A Peculiar Privilege in Historical Perspective: The Right to Remain 
Silent, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2625, 2625 (1996). 
5. See generally LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT: THE RIGHT 
AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION (1968) [hereinafter LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT]. 
6. Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1477, 
1533–35 (1999). 
7. The term “noncitizen” is used throughout this Article because the word encapsulates all 
people who properly can be subject to removal proceedings, which includes people in “nonimmigrant” 
statuses. See Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922) (stating that the executive has jurisdiction 
to order deportation “only if the person arrested is an alien”). This is not to discount the fact that 
sometimes U.S. citizens are improperly placed in removal proceedings and/or deported. See generally 
Jacqueline Stevens, U.S. Government Unlawfully Detaining and Deporting U.S. Citizens as Aliens, 18 
VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 606 (analyzing cases of people in removal proceedings who were later 
determined to be U.S. citizens). 
8. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 360 (2010) (describing “[t]he Nation’s first 100 years [as] 
‘a period of unimpeded immigration’” (quoting CHARLES GORDON & HARRY N. ROSENFIELD, 












have declined to extend a variety of procedural protections available in 
criminal proceedings to immigration proceedings.9 
However, clinging to a stagnant understanding of individuals’ rights in 
an environment of increasingly frequent and severe immigration 
enforcement amplifies the possibility of serious and widespread injustices. 
This phenomenon has been described as the “asymmetric” incorporation of 
criminal norms into the immigration system. 10  The overlap between 
criminal and immigration law (including immigration consequences for 
convictions, cooperation of local and state law enforcement with 
immigration authorities, and the inevitability of transfer to immigration 
custody following a criminal arrest) is increasing—a process many scholars 
refer to as “crimmigration.”11  Immigration enforcement officers’ tactics 
largely mirror the law enforcement strategies used to arrest and prosecute 
people accused of crimes, and state and local law enforcement regularly 
engage—legally or not—in those immigration enforcement strategies. 
Additionally, through legislation, case precedent, and opinions issued by the 
Attorney General, immigrants are increasingly civilly penalized for lesser 
and lesser crimes, with convictions carrying greater consequences in 
immigration proceedings.  
And yet, the right against self-incrimination has been deemed to have 
limited application because immigration proceedings are considered “civil.” 
Thus, noncitizens in immigration proceedings may choose to remain silent 
if they believe the testimony “might have a tendency to incriminate him or 
furnish proof of a link in a chain of evidence,”12 but not without legally 
sanctioned consequences. Namely, the immigration judge is permitted to 
 
9. See, e.g., INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050–51 (1984) (declining to extend the 
exclusionary rule to deportation proceedings); Xu Yong Lu v. Ashcroft, 259 F.3d 127, 131 (3d Cir. 
2001) (holding that there is no Sixth Amendment guarantee of appointed counsel in removal 
proceedings); Baires v. INS, 856 F.2d 89, 90–91 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that noncitizens in removal 
proceedings have a right to procedural due process under the Fifth Amendment, but not a right to counsel 
pursuant to the Sixth Amendment); U.S. ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149, 156–57 (1923) 
(finding that the rule excluding involuntary confessions does not apply in deportation proceedings); 
Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 544–46 (1952) (stating that Eighth Amendment requirement of 
reasonable bail does not apply in some deportation cases). 
10. Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law: Asymmetric Incorporation of 
Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 469, 527–528 (2007). 
11. See, e.g., Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign 
Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 367 (2006); Jennifer M. Chacón, A Diversion of Attention? Immigration 
Courts and the Adjudication of Fourth and Fifth Amendment Rights, 59 DUKE L.J. 1563 (2010); David 
Alan Sklansky, Crime, Immigration, and Ad Hoc Instrumentalism, 15 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 157 (2012); 
César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Creating Crimmigration, 2013 BYU L. REV. 1457, 1458; 
Yolanda Vázquez, Perpetuating the Marginalization of Latinos: A Collateral Consequence of the 
Incorporation of Immigration Law into the Criminal Justice System, 54 HOW. L.J. 639, 666 (2011). 
12. Matter of Carrillo, 17 I&N Dec. 30, 33 (BIA 1979) (citing Matter of R-, 4 I&N Dec. 720, 
721 (BIA 1952)). 











draw an adverse inference from the noncitizen’s silence.13 While an adverse 
inference is not sufficient for the government to meet its burden of proof on 
alienage or removability absent other evidence,14 adverse inferences greatly 
disadvantage noncitizens seeking bond or relief from removal. Noncitizens’ 
right against self-incrimination is therefore undermined during immigration 
proceedings. The procedures currently available do not adequately account 
for the quasi-criminal nature of some aspects of removal proceedings, or for 
the fact that many noncitizens do not have legal representation. 
Constitutional rights are meaningless without procedural vehicles 
through which they can be enforced. As the United States Supreme Court 
stated in Miranda v. Arizona, there must be “procedural safeguards effective 
to secure the privilege against self-incrimination.”15 A primary function of 
the right against self-incrimination is to prevent government overreach.16 
Considering the immense powers of the government, the right against self-
incrimination is critical in restoring some semblance of balance between the 
individual and the state.  
Large numbers of people are affected by the immigration system every 
year. For example, in the five-year period from 2013–2017, there were more 
than 1.5 million people removed from the United States.17 In fiscal year 
2019, the Department of Justice (DOJ) reported that there were 987,000 
cases pending in the immigration courts.18 The Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) filed 444,000 new cases in fiscal year 2019 alone, which 
marked the highest number of cases filed in a single year in United States 
history.19 In a system that is currently affecting nearly one million people, 
not to mention their families and broader communities, society should be 
concerned about whether the proceedings are being conducted fairly. In 
addition to general considerations of morality and individual dignity, 
procedural fairness is also critical to the perceived legitimacy of the legal 
system, which in turn affects whether people are likely to comply with the 
law.20 
 
13. Bilokumsky, 263 U.S. at 154. 
14. Matter of Guevara, 20 I&N Dec. 238, 242 (BIA 1991). 
15. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). 
16. United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 693 (1998). 
17. 432,448 people were removed in 2013; 405,620 in 2014; 326,406 in 2015; 333,592 in 2016; 
and 295,364 in 2017. Table 39. Aliens Removed or Returned: Fiscal Years 1892 to 2017, DEP’T OF 
HOMELAND SEC., https://www.dhs.gov/immigration-statistics/yearbook/2017/table39 (last updated Apr. 
9, 2019) [https://perma.cc/5WLV-ZDQU]. 
18. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Executive Office for Immigration Review Announces 
Case Completion Numbers for Fiscal Year 2019 (Oct. 10, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/executi 
ve-office-immigration-review-announces-case-completion-numbers-fiscal-year-2019?utm_medium=e 
mail&utm_source=govdelivery [hereinafter EOIR Case Numbers] [https://perma.cc/8TZ5-BENV]. 
19. Id. 
20. Emily Ryo, Legal Attitudes of Immigrant Detainees, 51 L. & SOC’Y REV. 99, 104 (2017) 












Application of the right against self-incrimination in immigration court 
is an underexplored area. In 1990, Daniel Kanstroom wrote on the subject 
in the context of Immigration and Naturalization Service attorneys seeking 
to establish elements of their prima facie cases by compelling respondents 
to testify in immigration court.21 Kanstroom addressed the extent to which 
those practices raised constitutional and policy questions. Since 
Kanstroom’s article, there have been numerous legal developments in both 
immigration proceedings and the scope of the right against self-
incrimination in criminal law that call for further examination of these 
issues.  
More recent scholarship has explored the right against self-incrimination 
during encounters with law enforcement.22 Jennifer M. Chacón raised the 
right against self-incrimination in terms of the limited application of both 
Fourth and Fifth Amendments in removal proceedings, illuminating how 
immigration courts were not designed, and are not equipped, to handle 
certain constitutional challenges. 23  Violeta R. Chapin has called for 
witnesses to crimes to exercise the right to silence as an act of civil 
disobedience in response to increasing immigration enforcement.24  
This Article adds to the scholarly discourse by focusing on the effect of 
“pleading the Fifth” in immigration court. Part I describes how the Fifth 
Amendment right against self-incrimination is currently applied during 
court proceedings, both in criminal and general civil courts. Part II examines 
the current categorization of immigration removal proceedings under the 
“civil” umbrella and addresses the need for procedural safeguards in 
immigration court due to the increasing criminalization of immigration. Part 
III delves into the scope of the right against self-incrimination in 
immigration court, including an analysis of how the effect of “pleading the 
Fifth” may differ based on considerations such as the burdens of proof and 
the scenario in which the right is raised. Part IV highlights the specific 
deficiencies in courts’ treatment of the right against self-incrimination in 
immigration proceedings and argues that, due to the quasi-criminal nature 
of such proceedings, noncitizens must be able to exercise the right more 
effectively. While this Article does not mean to imply that criminal 
proceedings provide a gold standard of procedural protections, it argues that 
a more robust application of this constitutional protection to noncitizens in 
removal proceedings would be far better than the current state of the law.  
 
21. Daniel Kanstroom, Hello Darkness: Involuntary Testimony and Silence as Evidence in 
Deportation Proceedings, 4 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 599 (1990). 
22. Linus Chan, The Promise and Failure of Silence as a Shield Against Immigration 
Enforcement, 52 VAL. U. L. REV. 289 (2018). 
23. Chacón, supra note 11. 
24. Violeta R. Chapin, ¡Silencio! Undocumented Immigrant Witnesses and the Right to Silence, 
17 MICH. J. RACE & L. 119 (2011). 











Lastly, to address the need for procedural safeguards in removal 
proceedings in an efficient and wide-reaching manner, Part V proposes new 
federal regulations that clarify, support, and expand the application of the 
right against self-incrimination in this context. 
I. SCOPE OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 
The right against self-incrimination has roots in the Latin maxim nemo 
tenetur seipsum prodere, which means “no man is bound to accuse 
himself.”25  Although the Fifth Amendment states that people cannot be 
compelled “in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,”26 the right 
against self-incrimination can also be invoked in civil contexts where the 
information could be used in later criminal proceedings.27 It is further clear 
that the Self-Incrimination Clause extends to state proceedings, 28  and 
protects noncitizens and citizens alike. 29  The Self-Incrimination Clause 
does not provide protection for anything other than testimony. While the 
Fifth Amendment’s testimonial protections have been hailed as a 
fundamental aspect of our criminal justice system, non-testimonial 
incriminating evidence, such as blood samples or incriminating documents, 
is not protected.30 
 
25. Leonard W. Levy, Origins of the Fifth Amendment and Its Critics, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 
821, 832 (1997) (responding to various criticisms of his book, LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH 
AMENDMENT, supra note 5). This Article refers to the “right” rather than the “privilege” against self-
incrimination as a recognition of its stature as a constitutional provision. The terms “right” and 
“privilege” are often used interchangeably by both courts and scholarly publications. On one hand, 
scholar Leonard Levy proclaimed that he does not refer to it as a “privilege” because “[p]rivileges are 
concessions granted by the government to its subjects and may be revoked.” LEVY, supra note 5, at vii. 
He states that, because the concept is enshrined in the Constitution, it holds “the same status as other 
rights, like freedom of religion, that we would never denigrate by describing them as mere privileges.” 
Id. On the other hand, information protected by a legitimate assertion of the right is considered 
“privileged” pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5). Judge Richard 
A. Posner calls the clause “[t]he most hallowed, and yet at the same time one of the most questionable, 
of the evidentiary privileges.” Posner, supra note 6, at 1533. Judge Posner identifies tension in the 
doctrine, first noting that non-self-incrimination “denies the court highly probative evidence.” Id. 
However, Judge Posner also recognizes that there is a strong policy argument for preserving an 
individual’s peace by forcing the government to procure evidence “from sources other than the 
individual.” Id. at 1533–34 (quoting 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW 
§ 2251, at 317 (John T. McNaughton ed., rev. ed. 1961)).  
26. U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added). 
27. United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 672 (1998). 
28. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 3 (1964) (recognizing that the right against self-incrimination 
extends to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment). 
29. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976) (“There are literally millions of aliens within the 
jurisdiction of the United States. The Fifth Amendment, as well as the Fourteenth Amendment, protects 
every one of these persons from deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. . . . 
Even one whose presence in this country is unlawful, involuntary, or transitory is entitled to that 
constitutional protection.”) (citations omitted). 












A. Criminal Proceedings 
Several aspects of the Fifth Amendment have developed over time in 
Supreme Court jurisprudence, yielding an uneven application throughout 
history. Case law reflects the disparate views of the scope of the right 
against self-incrimination and shows how the scope changes depending on 
the makeup of the high court. Several cases have been hotly contested 
among the justices, and much of the case law also appears internally 
inconsistent. Before diving into a discussion of the right, it will be helpful 
to observe how the right against self-incrimination developed prior to and 
throughout American jurisprudence, and its limitations. 
1. History of the Right 
The history of the right against self-incrimination in criminal 
proceedings has been extensively debated. 31  From some scholars’ 
perspective, the principle has not been consistently applied throughout the 
centuries, but rather appears to have transformed along with developments 
in the burden of proof and availability of counsel.  
In English trials during the mid-1500s, defendants bore the burden of 
proving innocence. The manner of trials was termed “accused speaks,” 
where the accused was expected to defend themselves by responding 
directly to evidence and witnesses at trial.32 The “accused speaks” manner 
of criminal trials meant that a defendant who remained silent would simply 
lose their case.33  Thus, due to trial procedure during that era, the right 
against self-incrimination simply could not have been an effective form of 
defense.  
Moreover, there was no right to counsel, and defense counsel were even 
prohibited in felony and treason cases.34 The prohibition on defense counsel 
lessened beginning in the 1690s, paving the way for the nature of criminal 
trials to shift from the “accused speaks” trial where defendants had to prove 
their innocence, to the type of criminal trials we have today where the 
prosecution bears the burden of proof.35  The English courts eventually 
 
31. See, e.g., Levy, supra note 25, at 832 (responding to various criticisms of his book, LEVY, 
ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT, supra note 5). 
32. The right began as something akin to “probable cause,” where a person would not be required 
to answer incriminating questions unless there were other existing reasons for suspecting them. R.H. 
HELMHOLZ ET AL., THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION: ITS ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT 7 
(1997); John H. Langbein, The Privilege and Common Law Criminal Procedure: The Sixteenth to the 
Eighteenth Centuries, in THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION: ITS ORIGINS AND 
DEVELOPMENT, supra, at 83. 
33. Langbein, supra note 32, at 108. 
34. Id. at 84 n.6. 
35. Id. at 97. 











imposed the standard that the prosecution had to establish guilt “beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”36  
The idea that “no man is bound to accuse himself” was imported to 
colonial America, eventually becoming one of the fundamental rights 
proclaimed in the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. As 
the Supreme Court noted, the American colonists considered the right to 
refuse to speak, “which in England was a mere rule of evidence,” so 
fundamental that it should be “clothed in this country with the 
impregnability of a constitutional enactment.”37  
2. Rationales 
Examination of the Supreme Court’s articulation of the reasoning behind 
the Self-Incrimination Clause demonstrates how its interpretation of the 
right has changed over time. Additionally, understanding the underlying 
purpose of the Clause aids in the determination of whether the right against 
self-incrimination should apply in particular circumstances. 38  It bears 
briefly exploring the convoluted explanations and outright rejection of the 
Court’s own prior statements by later iterations of the bench. 
In the 1950s, the Supreme Court proclaimed that a primary rationale was 
that it is better for an occasional crime to go unpunished than the prosecution 
be free to build up a criminal case with the assistance of compelled 
disclosures of the defendant. The right protects the innocent as well as the 
guilty.39 However, that rationale was disputed just one year later, when the 
Court more narrowly stated that the purpose of the Self-Incrimination 
Clause was to protect the innocent.40 
The following decade, the Court decided Murphy v. Waterfront 
Commission of New York Harbor, where the Court recited the policies 
underlying the “privilege” against self-incrimination as including the 
following:  
It reflects many of our fundamental values and most noble 
aspirations: our unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to 
the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt; our 
 
36. Id. at 98. 
37. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 443 (1966) (quoting Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 
596–97 (1896)). 
38. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 54 (1964) (stating that whether 
a witness may be compelled to testify in one jurisdiction where he may be incriminated under the laws 
of another jurisdiction “must depend, of course, on whether such an application of the privilege promotes 
or defeats its policies and purposes”), abrogated by United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666 (1998). 
39. Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 427 (1956). 
40. Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 421 (1957) (“Recent re-examination of the history 
and meaning of the Fifth Amendment has emphasized anew that one of the basic functions of the 












preference for an accusatorial rather than an inquisitorial system of 
criminal justice; our fear that self-incriminating statements will be 
elicited by inhumane treatment and abuses; our sense of fair play 
which dictates “a fair state-individual balance by requiring the 
government to leave the individual alone until good cause is shown 
for disturbing him and by requiring the government in its contest with 
the individual to shoulder the entire load”; our respect for the 
inviolability of the human personality and of the right of each 
individual “to a private enclave where he may lead a private life”; our 
distrust of self-deprecatory statements; and our realization that the 
privilege, while sometimes “a shelter to the guilty,” is often “a 
protection to the innocent.”41 
Based on the “history, policies and purposes” of the Self-Incrimination 
Clause, the Murphy Court held that witnesses in state proceedings enjoy 
protections from incrimination under federal law, and vice versa.42 
However, the majority in United States v. Balsys later rolled back the 
holding of Murphy, explaining that the historical analysis in Murphy was 
“fatally flawed,” and holding that the Fifth Amendment could not be 
invoked to avoid testifying based on fear that the testimony would be used 
in foreign criminal prosecutions.43 The Balsys majority also emphasized 
that preventing government overreach was the true value at the center of the 
Self-Incrimination Clause.44 This is presently understood to be the primary 
accepted rationale.45 
 
41. Murphy, 378 U.S. at 55 (citations omitted) (quoting WIGMORE, supra note 25, at 317; United 
States v. Grunewald, 233 F.2d 556, 581–82 (Frank, J., dissenting), rev’d, 353 U.S. 391 (1957); Quinn 
v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 162 (1955)). 
42. Id. at 77–78. 
43. United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 688, 700 (1998). 
44. Id. at 693. Another theory that has been widely written about, but was explicitly rejected in 
Balsys, is that the right against self-incrimination supports the right to lead a private life. See, e.g., 
HELMHOLZ ET AL., supra note 32, at 4; William J. Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of Criminal 
Procedure, 105 YALE L.J. 393, 444 (1995) (stating that privacy is the center of search and seizure law); 
David Dolinko, Is There a Rationale for the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination?, 33 UCLA L. REV. 
1063, 1067–68 (1986) (arguing that compelled self-incrimination violates individual privacy); B. 
Michael Dann, The Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: Extorting Physical Evidence 
from a Suspect, 43 S. CAL. L. REV. 597, 598, 611 (1970) (asserting that the Self-Incrimination Doctrine 
includes a privacy-based theory).  
45. See, e.g., Jennifer Reich, A New Hurdle to International Cooperation in Criminal 
Investigations: Whether Foreign Government-Compelled Testimony Implicates the Privilege Against 
Self-Incrimination, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 789, 823 (2018) (weighing effect of a proposed test on the right 
against self-incrimination, including whether the test would “save judicial resources without detracting 
from the goal of preventing government overreach”). 











3. Procedural Elements 
A substantive constitutional right such as non-self-incrimination is 
meaningless without procedural mechanisms to ensure that the right is 
protected. What is described broadly as the “right against self-
incrimination” is actually a bundle of rights that can be invoked at different 
stages before and during criminal proceedings. 
a. Refusal to Testify at Trial 
Broadly stated, a person can choose to remain silent in the face of 
questioning at trial. A criminal defendant has the right to choose whether to 
testify, and the defendant’s silence cannot be commented on by the judge or 
the prosecutor in front of a jury.46  
However, there are some limitations to the application of the right 
against self-incrimination that bear explanation. First, a party may seek to 
compel testimony from the person asserting the right. For example, a 
witness can be compelled to testify if the party seeking the testimony obtains 
a grant of immunity from prosecution.47 There are three types of immunity: 
one that bars the government from using the testimony as evidence but 
allows possible future prosecution for the crime (use immunity); one that 
prohibits the government from using information that was directly or 
indirectly obtained against the person (derivative use immunity); and one 
that protects the immunized witness from ever being prosecuted for any 
offense related to the testimony (transactional immunity).48 If immunity is 
granted, the person’s silence will be considered “unprivileged,” and they 
can be compelled to speak or face consequences.49 
b. Prohibition on Use of Compelled Statements 
Beyond the general trial right to remain silent, there is also a prohibition 
on the use of pretrial statements that were obtained by compulsion. 
Specifically, in Murphy, the Supreme Court stated that one critical way the 
Fifth Amendment is applied to protect rights is that “[t]he Government may 
not use compulsion to elicit self-incriminating statements,” and that “the 
Government may not permit the use in a criminal trial of self-incriminating 
 
46. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965). 
47. See Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 254–55 (1983); Kastigar v. United States, 406 
U.S. 441, 460 (1972).  
48. AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF ANTITRUST L., THE RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION IN 
CIVIL LITIGATION 7 (2001) [hereinafter ABA TREATISE]. 












statements elicited by compulsion.”50 Generally, the right may be raised 
either by the person testifying or their attorney.51 The right must be asserted 
“on a question-by-question basis, and thus as to each question asked, the 
party has to decide whether or not to raise his Fifth Amendment right.”52  
c. Custodial Interrogations 
In Miranda v. Arizona, the Supreme Court extended the right to remain 
silent to unsworn custodial interrogations by law enforcement, in order to 
protect criminal defendants’ rights at trial.53 Once a person invokes their 
right to remain silent, or their right to speak to an attorney, the police must 
cease interrogation, and any statements made without these procedural 
safeguards will be inadmissible in court.54  However, Miranda warnings 
must only be given when the person being interrogated is in custody, 
meaning that the person’s freedom has been limited “in any significant 
way.”55 
Limitations on what initially appeared to be a broad right have developed 
over time. As Erwin Chemerinsky has explained, the Roberts Court in 
particular rolled back the right against self-incrimination in a manner 
exhibiting a “lack of concern with precedent and stare decisis.” 56  For 
example, the Court held that self-incriminating speech during an 
investigation when the defendant was not yet under arrest was not 
protected, 57  nor were the defendant’s changes in demeanor during the 
course of the interview barred from being offered as incriminating 
evidence.58 More recently, the Supreme Court held that a suspect waived his 
right to remain silent once he made “an uncoerced statement to the police,”59 
even though he had sat “tacit and uncommunicative through nearly three 
 
50. 378 U.S. 52, 57 n.6 (1964) (citing Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 513 (1963); 
Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 586 (1892)), abrogated by United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 
666, 674 (1998). 
51. See, e.g., Gutierrez v. Holder, 662 F.3d 1083, 1085, 1091 (9th Cir. 2011); Garcia-Quintero 
v. Gonzales, 455 F.3d 1006, 1019 (9th Cir. 2006); Murdock v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 131 F. App’x 360, 
361 (3d Cir. 2005); Bigby v. INS, 21 F.3d 1059, 1063 (11th Cir. 1994); but see United States v. Schmidt, 
816 F.2d 1477, 1481 n.3 (10th Cir. 1987) (“Only the appellants, not their counsel, are the proper parties 
to interpose a claim of privilege personal to themselves to prevent compelled disclosures . . . .”). 
52. See Garcia-Quintero, 455 F.3d at 1019 (quoting Doe ex rel. Rudy-Glanzer v. Glanzer, 232 
F.3d 1258, 1263 (9th Cir. 2000)). 
53. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). 
54. Id. at 444–45. 
55. Id. at 444. 
56. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Roberts Court and Criminal Procedure at Age Five, 43 TEX. TECH 
L. REV. 13, 19 (2010). 
57. Salinas v. Texas, 570 U.S. 178, 185–86 (2013). 
58. Id. at 182. 
59. Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 388–89 (2010). 











hours of police interrogation” prior to making the statement.60 Chemerinsky 
has noted that Thompkins created a presumption of admissibility of 
confessions, unless the suspect has explicitly stated his wish to remain 
silent.61 Ironically, the Court’s ruling therefore means that suspects must 
speak in order to invoke the right to remain silent.62 
Lastly, there is significant confusion around the issue of when someone 
is considered to be “in custody.” The considerations include “the nature and 
context of the questions asked, together with the nature and degree of 
restraints placed on the person questioned.”63 
The continually developing jurisprudence surrounding the right against 
self-incrimination in the context of custodial interrogations highlights the 
clause’s incredible complexity, as well as the difficulty for lay people to 
effectively exercise their rights.  
B. Civil Proceedings, Generally 
The right against self-incrimination can be raised in civil proceedings, 
yet to a more limited extent than in criminal settings.64 A person may refrain 
from answering questions in any context where their statements “might 
incriminate [them] in future criminal proceedings.”65 To be clear, however, 
the right cannot be invoked merely to avoid civil penalties.66  
Importantly, as opposed to the rule in criminal proceedings where the 
judge and prosecutor are prohibited from commenting on the accused 
person’s silence,67 there is a “prevailing rule that the Fifth Amendment does 
not forbid adverse inferences against parties to civil actions when they 
refuse to testify in response to probative evidence offered against them.”68 
Thus, in civil cases, once probative evidence has been introduced, the trier 
of fact—whether the jury or the judge in a bench trial—is permitted to draw 
an adverse inference based on the refusal to testify.69  
 
60. Id. at 391 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
61. Erwin Chemerinsky, Supreme Court—October Term 2009 Foreword: Conservative Judicial 
Activism, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 863, 882 (2011). 
62. Thompkins, 560 U.S. at 391 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); see also Daniel Kanstroom, The 
Right to Deportation Counsel in Padilla v. Kentucky: The Challenging Construction of the Fifth-and-a-
Half Amendment, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1461, 1514 (2011) (discussing the rollback of Miranda protections). 
63. United States v. FNU LNU, 653 F.3d 144, 154 (2d Cir. 2011) (citing Berkemer v. McCarty, 
468 U.S. 420, 441 n.34 (1984)). 
64. An early commentator on the right against self-accusation, Samuel von Pufendorf, concluded 
in 1729 that the right should apply in both civil and criminal cases. LEVY, supra note 25, at 373. 
65. Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 316 (1976) (citing Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 
(1973)). 
66. Mertsching v. United States, 704 F.2d 505, 507 (10th Cir. 1983). 
67. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965). 
68. Baxter, 425 U.S. at 318 (emphasis added).  












Invoking the right does not automatically cease all inquiry during civil 
proceedings. To determine whether the right has been properly invoked, a 
court first considers whether the witness’s testimony (or evidence) might 
tend to incriminate the witness, meaning that the testimony would support 
a criminal conviction or would constitute a link in the chain of evidence 
needed to convict the witness of a crime.70 The court then ascertains whether 
there is a risk that the witness faces the possibility of being prosecuted for a 
crime. 71  The likelihood that a person will be prosecuted is not the 
determining factor.72 Rather, if the court finds that prosecution is merely 
possible, the person is entitled to remain silent. However, the court may 
compel the witness to testify under certain circumstances. For example, the 
court must ascertain whether the person has been granted immunity from 
prosecution, as discussed supra,73 or whether the statute of limitations has 
run on the potential crime.74 If the statute of limitations has run, prosecution 
will not be possible, and the right against self-incrimination would not be 
deemed to apply. 
The Supreme Court has imposed other limits on the application of the 
right against self-incrimination in civil proceedings. For example, United 
States v. Balsys involved the Office of Special Investigations of the Criminal 
Division of the United States Department of Justice (DOJ), which initiated 
denaturalization and deportation proceedings against suspected Nazi war 
criminals. In that case, the DOJ sought enforcement of a subpoena against 
a noncitizen who was being investigated for such activity.75 At a deposition, 
Balsys refused to answer questions, asserting his right against self-
incrimination on the grounds that he would face prosecution in Lithuania, 
Israel, and Germany, even though he would not be subject to criminal 
prosecution in the United States. 76  Thus, the question presented to the 
Supreme Court was whether a lawful permanent resident suspected of being 
a Nazi collaborator could assert the right against self-incrimination for the 
purpose of avoiding foreign prosecution.77 The Court analyzed the meaning 
of “a criminal case” and held that concern about foreign prosecution was 
beyond the scope of the right articulated in the Constitution.78 Thus, the 
extent of the right against self-incrimination was narrowed further in the 
civil context. 
 
70. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951). 
71. Id.  
72. ABA TREATISE, supra note 48, at 28.  
73.  See supra Part I.A.3.a. 
74. Id. 
75. United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 669–70 (1998). 
76. Id. at 670.  
77. Id. at 669–70. 
78. Id. at 669. 











II. THE NATURE OF IMMIGRATION & IMMIGRATION COURT PROCEDURE 
As described above, it is broadly accepted that the Fifth Amendment 
right against self-incrimination may be exercised in civil proceedings, 
where testimony given in those proceedings could lead to a criminal 
prosecution. 79  The civil application of the right is also available in 
immigration court.80 However, such protection does not go far enough in 
the immigration context. First, rules and procedures deemed essential to 
fairness in other civil matters do not apply in immigration courts. Evidence 
is admissible in immigration court so long as it is probative and not 
fundamentally unfair.81 Moreover, the Federal Rules of Evidence are not 
binding in immigration court. 82  Nor are the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, which protect information that may be deemed privileged.83 
Second, although the immigration system is characterized as civil, it 
functions in a quasi-criminal manner in many important aspects. And even 
as the enforcement model of criminal law is increasingly imported into 
immigration proceedings, the procedural protections are not.  
A. Immigration as a Civil System 
In criminal cases, constitutional provisions found in the Fourth, Fifth, 
Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments apply.84 In immigration cases, the far 
more limited constitutional protections stem from the Due Process Clause 
of the Fifth Amendment. 85  One justification given for such restricted 
 
79. McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, 40 (1924); see also Matter of Carrillo, 17 I&N Dec. 30, 
32–33 (BIA 1979). 
80. “The Board of Immigration Appeals correctly ruled that some of the evidence of the 
petitioner’s employment was inadmissible because it was elicited from the petitioner on the stand after 
he was improperly denied his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.” Tashnizi v. INS, 
585 F.2d 781, 782 (5th Cir. 1978). 
81. Matter of Ramirez-Sanchez, 17 I&N Dec. 503, 505–06 (BIA 1980). Although “[t]he use of 
admissions obtained from a respondent involuntarily to establish deportability is fundamentally unfair,” 
there is a high bar for involuntary admissions, which must involve “coercion or duress” such as “physical 
abuse, hours of interrogation, denial of food or drink, threats or promises, or interference with any 
attempt by the respondent to exercise his rights.” Id. at 505, 506 (citing Matter of Garcia, 17 I&N Dec. 
319, 321 (BIA 1980)). 
82. Matter of D-R-, 25 I&N Dec. 445, 458 (BIA 2011). However, it bears noting that the BIA in 
Matter of D-R- went on to analyze the sufficiency of authentication of documents using Federal Rule of 
Evidence 901(a)-(b)(1). Id. at 459. 
83. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5). 
84. Franklin G. Whittlesey, Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments—Substantive Due Process—
Malicious Prosecution Does Not Constitute a Deprivation of Liberty Actionable as a Constitutional Tort 
Pursuant to the Due Process Clause—Albright v. Oliver, 114 S. Ct. 807 (1994), 5 SETON HALL CONST. 
L.J. 269, 280–81 (stating that explicit criminal justice protections are afforded under the Fourth, Fifth, 
Sixth, and Eighth Amendments). 













constitutional protections in the immigration arena is the broad sovereign 
power of the federal government to control exclusion of foreigners from the 
United States. 86  A second reason is the related categorization of 
immigration proceedings as being “civil” in nature.87 
Immigration to the United States was largely unrestrained from the 
nation’s founding until 1875, when Congress determined that two 
populations should be barred from entry: “convicts and prostitutes.”88 It was 
not until 1917 that the government began deporting people who had been 
convicted of crimes after they had already arrived in the United States.89 
Congress’s passage of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 
(AEDPA) and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) in 1996 also substantially changed 
immigration law to increase the likelihood that criminal behavior would 
lead to deportation.90  
Over time, the Supreme Court’s theory that the power to exclude or expel 
people was part of a nation’s inherent sovereign rights has led to its 
conclusion that Congress has “absolute and unqualified” power to regulate 
exclusion or expulsion of those who are not citizens of the United States.91 
This congressional function is now commonly referred to as “plenary 
power.”92 The Supreme Court, on this basis, has stated that it holds limited 
authority to review the constitutionality of immigration statutes or otherwise 
consider whether there have been violations of individual rights, in that the 
judiciary may only intervene to the extent it is “authorized by treaty or by 
 
Transfers: Moving LPRs to Isolated Prisons Violates Their Right to Counsel, 21 BERKELEY LA RAZA 
L.J. 17, 25–32 (2011) (describing the limited applications of the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause 
in immigration law). 
86. Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 604 (1889) 
(“The powers to declare war, make treaties, suppress insurrection, repel invasion, regulate foreign 
commerce, secure republican governments to the States, and admit subjects of other nations to 
citizenship, are all sovereign powers, restricted in their exercise only by the Constitution itself and 
considerations of public policy and justice which control, more or less, the conduct of all civilized 
nations.”). 
87. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984). 
88. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 360 (2010) (citing Page Act of 1875, Pub. L. No. 43-114, 
18 Stat. 477). 
89. Stumpf, supra note 11, at 382; see also Siegfried Hesse, The Constitutional Status of the 
Lawfully Admitted Permanent Resident Alien: The Inherent Limits of the Power to Expel, 69 YALE L.J. 
262, 263 (1959). 
90. Anita Ortiz Maddali, Padilla v. Kentucky: A New Chapter in Supreme Court Jurisprudence 
on Whether Deportation Constitutes Punishment for Lawful Permanent Residents?, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 
1, 18–19 (2011). 
91. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 707, 713 (1893). The Supreme Court’s 
reliance on the extra-constitutional principle of “sovereignty” as the basis for the power to exclude and 
expel has been subject to criticism. See STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND THE JUDICIARY: 
LAW AND POLITICS IN BRITAIN AND AMERICA 184–86 (1987). 
92. LEGOMSKY, supra note 91, at 194–200.  











statute, or is required by the paramount law of the Constitution.”93 Thus, 
although Congress has broad power to exclude or expel, and immigration 
cases are currently seen as civil rather than criminal, this broad power is still 
subject to certain constitutional limitations.94 
The categorization of immigration proceedings as “civil” is rooted in the 
plenary power doctrine.95 In short, because of the federal government’s 
broad power to regulate immigration, removal proceedings are simply 
viewed as an administrative process “enforcing the return to his own 
country of an alien who has not complied” with the government’s conditions 
for remaining.96 Thus, as explained in Fong Yue Ting, “deportation is not a 
punishment for crime,” and the due process “provisions of the Constitution, 
securing the right of trial by jury, and prohibiting unreasonable searches and 
seizures, and cruel and unusual punishments, have no application.”97  
This “civil nature” reasoning was later upheld in a 1984 seminal case, 
INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, in which the Supreme Court explained that various 
protections afforded in criminal cases do not apply in deportation 
proceedings. 98  Thus, although criminal procedure allows for the 
suppression of statements or other evidence obtained as a result of an 
unlawful arrest, the Court held that the exclusionary rule was not available 
to noncitizens in removal proceedings. Rather, the Court imposed a new 
standard that a noncitizen must show not only a constitutional violation, but 
that the circumstances were sufficiently “egregious” to undermine the 
probative value of the evidence or make use of the evidence fundamentally 
unfair.99  
Later cases clarified that racial profiling was egregious enough to justify 
use of the exclusionary rule. For example, two cases in the Ninth Circuit 
pointed out the repugnant nature of race-based Fourth Amendment 
violations where noncitizens were stopped based on their racial appearance 
 
93. Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 713. 
94. See id.; Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001) (“Freedom from imprisonment—from 
government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that 
[the Due Process] Clause protects.”). 
95. Alina Das, Administrative Constitutionalism in Immigration Law, 98 B.U. L. REV. 485, 497 
(2018). 
96. Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 730. For a historical perspective on this case, see KELLY LYTLE 
HERNÁNDEZ, CITY OF INMATES: CONQUEST, REBELLION, AND THE RISE OF HUMAN CAGING IN LOS 
ANGELES, 1771–1965, at 64–91 (2017). 
97. Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 730. 
98. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984). 












or surname.100 Other circuits have followed suit in determining that racial 
profiling is an egregious circumstance that may give rise to exclusion.101 
The Lopez-Mendoza Court also specifically stated that it did not consider 
whether the immigration officials violated their own regulations, and further 
noted that the Court could revisit its ruling in the future if confronted with 
a pattern of “widespread” violations.102 Thus, the Court left those areas open 
to further litigation.  
Yet, for all these restrictions stemming from the plenary power doctrine, 
courts have still found ways to address substantive violations. As noted by 
Hiroshi Motomura, when courts have been troubled by the harshness of 
plenary power, they instead have construed issues as “procedural” and 
reached a decision through that lens.103  
Just a few years after the Supreme Court explained that aspects of due 
process did not apply to deportation proceedings in Fong Yue Ting, the 
Court proclaimed that immigration officers could not “disregard the 
fundamental principles that inhere in ‘due process of law.’”104 However, 
procedural due process claims at that time faced an extremely high bar of 
having to show “manifest unfairness.”105 Presently, the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments are understood to be the sources of noncitizens’ entitlement 
to procedural due process. 106  In essence, due process now means that 
removal proceedings must be fundamentally fair.107 A paramount aspect of 
fairness is that noncitizens are entitled to have “a full and fair hearing,”108 
 
100. Kevin R. Johnson, How Racial Profiling in America Became the Law of the Land: United 
States v. Brignoni-Ponce and Whren v. United States and the Need for Truly Rebellious Lawyering, 98 
GEO. L.J. 1005, 1032 (2010) (discussing Gonzalez-Rivera v. INS, 22 F.3d 1441 (9th Cir. 1994) and 
Orhorhaghe v. INS, 38 F.3d 488, 492 (9th Cir. 1994)). 
101. Puc-Ruiz v. Holder, 629 F.3d 771, 779 (8th Cir. 2010) (citing Almeida-Amaral v. Gonzales, 
461 F.3d 231, 236 (2d Cir. 2006)). 
102. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1050 (“Our conclusions concerning the exclusionary rule’s 
value might change, if there developed good reason to believe that Fourth Amendment violations by 
INS officers were widespread.”). Indeed, a case has been made that the application of the exclusionary 
rule in removal proceedings should be revisited both because Fourth Amendment violations have 
become widespread, and because of fundamental changes in immigration enforcement that have 
occurred since Lopez-Mendoza was decided in 1984. See generally Stella Burch Elias, “Good Reason 
to Believe”: Widespread Constitutional Violations in the Course of Immigration Enforcement and the 
Case for Revisiting Lopez-Mendoza, 2008 WIS. L. REV. 1109. 
103. Hiroshi Motomura, The Curious Evolution of Immigration Law: Procedural Surrogates for 
Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1625, 1628 (1992). 
104. Yamataya v. Fisher (The Japanese Immigrant Case), 189 U.S. 86, 100 (1903). 
105. See, e.g., Low Wah Suey v. Backus, 225 U.S. 460, 468 (1912). 
106. Matter of M-A-M-, 25 I&N Dec. 474, 479 (BIA 2011) (citing Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 
306 (1993)); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976). 
107. Tashnizi v. INS, 585 F.2d 781, 782 (5th Cir. 1978); Matter of Ramirez-Sanchez, 17 I&N 
Dec. 503, 505 (BIA 1980); Matter of Lam, 14 I&N Dec. 168, 170 (BIA 1972); see also Kanstroom, 
supra note 21, at 633–34 (“There is no question that aliens in deportation proceedings are entitled to due 
process, and the touchstone in this setting is ‘fundamental fairness.’”). 
108. Matter of M-A-M-, 25 I&N Dec. 474, 479 (BIA 2011) (citing Matter of M-D-, 23 I&N Dec. 
540, 542 (BIA 2002)). 











such that they have “the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and 
in a meaningful manner.”109  
B. Criminalization of Removal Proceedings  
There is increasing recognition of the overlap between criminal and 
immigration law. The overlap tracks the false specter of the “criminal alien” 
in mainstream representations of immigrants, including former President 
Trump’s references to Mexican immigrants in this manner: “When Mexico 
sends its people, they’re not sending their best. . . . They’re sending people 
that have lots of problems, and they’re bringing those problems with us. 
They’re bringing drugs. They’re bringing crime. They’re rapists. And some, 
I assume, are good people.” 110  While data has long and consistently 
contradicted this false narrative that immigrants commit, and/or are 
convicted of, crimes more often than other populations, 111  the 
criminalization trend continues nonetheless. 
Increasing criminalization of noncitizens calls for incorporating more 
stringent procedural protections into immigration proceedings. While in 
some cases criminal proceedings already occurred prior to removal 
proceedings and noncitizens therefore may not have a viable argument 
regarding self-incrimination, criminal proceedings also may be ongoing or 
even occur after removal proceedings. It is therefore critical to understand 
the intersections of these two systems of enforcement in order to most fully 
preserve noncitizens’ right against self-incrimination. 
The Supreme Court has reflected that “deportation is . . . intimately 
related to the criminal process,” yet the high court has never gone so far as 
to say that deportation is a punishment for crime.112 This has led numerous 
jurists and scholars to scrutinize the “civil” categorization of immigration 
 
109. Brue v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 1227, 1233 (10th Cir. 2006) (citing Schroeck v. Gonzales, 429 
F.3d 947, 952 (10th Cir. 2005)). 
110. Donald Trump, Presidential Bid Announcement Speech (June 16, 2015), in Here’s Donald 
Trump’s Presidential Announcement Speech, TIME (June 16, 2015, 2:32 PM), https://time.com/392312 
8/donald-trump-announcement-speech/ [https://perma.cc/NP7M-DKVY]. 
111. Anna Flagg, Is There a Connection Between Undocumented Immigrants and Crime?, THE 
MARSHALL PROJECT (May 13, 2019), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2019/05/13/is-there-a-conne 
ction-between-undocumented-immigrants-and-crime [https://perma.cc/62M9-7UES]; Alex Nowrasteh, 
Illegal Immigrants and Crime – Assessing the Evidence, CATO INST. (Mar. 4, 2019, 1:16 PM), https://ww 
w.cato.org/blog/illegal-immigrants-crime-assessing-evidence [https://perma.cc/N3SC-AVND]; Tom K. 
Wong, The Effects of Sanctuary Policies on Crime and the Economy, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Jan. 26, 
2017, 1:00 AM), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/immigration/reports/2017/01/26/297366/the 
-effects-of-sanctuary-policies-on-crime-and-the-economy [https://perma.cc/9STD-U4GE]; Rubén G. 
Rumbaut & Walter A. Ewing, The Myth of Immigrant Criminality, SOC. SCI. RSCH. COUNCIL (May 23, 
2007), https://items.ssrc.org/border-battles/the-myth-of-immigrant-criminality [https://perma.cc/P7QE-
NM86]; Matthew T. Lee, Ramiro Martinez, Jr. & Richard Rosenfeld, Does Immigration Increase 
Homicide? Negative Evidence from Three Border Cities, 42 SOCIO. Q. 559, 560, 571–74 (2001). 












proceedings. For example, Justices Brewer, Field, and Fuller wrote dissents 
in the Fong Yue Ting case, stating outright their opinion that deportation 
constitutes punishment.113  
Scholar Stephen Legomsky has explained that, in determining 
deportation is not equivalent to “punishment,” the Supreme Court failed to 
address other basic principles of criminal theory. 114  For example, the 
Supreme Court did not address the theory of incapacitation, even though 
deportation certainly constitutes “the isolation of the undesirable offender 
from society.”115 Deportation serves as deterrence for the same reason and 
serves as retribution when a person’s legal status is revoked because they 
have been convicted of a crime.116 Other scholars have also noted that the 
purposes of deportation, particularly for lawful permanent residents, are in 
line with deterrence, incapacitation, and retribution.117 
Juliet Stumpf highlights the nature of the parties involved in order to 
demonstrate that removal proceedings are more similar to criminal 
proceedings than other types of civil proceedings. While civil litigation 
typically involves the regulation of behavior between private parties, 
criminal and immigration law regulate the relationship between the state 
and the individual.118 More specifically, “[b]oth immigration and criminal 
law marshal the sovereign power of the state to punish and to express 
societal condemnation for the individual offender.”119  
Others have addressed the fact that the trappings of the immigration 
system bear a striking resemblance to the criminal justice system. 120 
Noncitizens are subject to arrest for suspected immigration law violations, 
sometimes based on warrants that are issued by governmental actors. They 
are interrogated, during which time the law enforcement officers take a 
sworn statement. The government then issues a charging document, gives 
 
113. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 733, 759, 763 (1893) (Brewer, J., Field, J. & 
Fuller, C.J., dissenting). Justice Brewer eloquently stated this idea in his dissent in Fong Yue Ting:  
But the Constitution has potency everywhere within the limits of our territory, and the powers 
which the national government may exercise within such limits are those, and only those, given 
to it by that instrument. Now, the power to remove resident aliens is, confessedly, not 
expressed. Even if it be among the powers implied, yet still it can be exercised only in 
subordination to the limitations and restrictions imposed by the Constitution. 
Id. at 738 (Brewer, J., dissenting). 
114. Legomsky, supra note 10, at 514. 
115. Id. 
116. Id. 
117. Ortiz Maddali, supra note 90, at 43–44. 
118. Stumpf, supra note 11, at 379. 
119. Id.  
120. See generally Stumpf, supra note 11; Legomsky, supra note 10; Jennifer M. Chacón, 
Unsecured Borders: Immigration Restrictions, Crime Control and National Security, 39 CONN. L. REV. 
1827 (2007); Ingrid V. Eagly, Prosecuting Immigration, 104 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1281 (2010); Hernández, 
supra note 11.  











formal notice to the noncitizen, and files the charges in court, which initiates 
removal proceedings.121 Moreover, noncitizens may be detained while they 
await trial, as described infra in Section II.B.3. 
Additionally, the seemingly ever-increasing immigration consequences 
of criminal convictions, increasing prosecution of federal criminal cases 
pertaining to immigration violations, and increasing use of detention are all 
indicative of the criminalization of civil removal proceedings.  
1. Immigration Enforcement Programs 
The role of local law enforcement in cooperating with the federal 
government to effectuate immigration enforcement—specifically through 
the officers and technology of the criminal system—bears mentioning. Two 
main programs have garnered attention: 287(g) and Secure Communities. 
Named for the section of the immigration statute, the 287(g) program 
deputizes local law enforcement to carry out the functions of federal 
immigration officials. 122  ICE describes 287(g) agreements as “mutually 
beneficial agreements [that] allow state and local officers to act as a force 
multiplier in the identification, arrest, and service of warrants and detainers 
of incarcerated foreign-born individuals with criminal charges or 
convictions.”123 As of January 2021, ICE has 287(g) agreements with 148 
law enforcement agencies.124  
As opposed to 287(g), which grants immigration enforcement powers to 
local law enforcement officers, the Secure Communities program is an 
information-sharing technology where fingerprints obtained by any law 
enforcement agency are automatically sent to DHS.125 Secure Communities 
was in effect from 2008 until it was suspended during the Obama 
administration in 2014, and then reinstated during the Trump administration 
on January 25, 2017.126 ICE proclaims that Secure Communities has led to 
the removal of “over 363,400 criminal aliens from the U.S.”127  
Violeta R. Chapin has thoroughly explained the criticisms lodged, even 
by law enforcement officials, regarding the efficacy of 287(g) and Secure 
 
121. 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a) (service of Notice to Appear); § 1229a (role of immigration judge and 
conduct of removal proceedings). 
122. Chapin, supra note 24, at 120. 
123. Delegation of Immigration Authority Section 287(g) Immigration and Nationality Act, U.S. 
IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T, https://www.ice.gov/287g (last updated Jan. 21, 2021) [https://perma.cc/E6 
7L-MBUR]. 
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Communities. 128  Local police officers and sheriffs have voiced their 
concerns that increased cooperation with federal immigration enforcement 
endangers communities because immigrants are less likely to report crimes 
out of fear that they will be taken into custody themselves.129 They have also 
raised concerns that adding immigration enforcement duties would increase 
racial profiling and would also impose too big of a burden on local law 
enforcement budgets.130 Nonetheless, these programs not only continue, but 
constitute a major aspect of the criminalization of immigration. 
2. Increased Penalties for Criminal Convictions 
Once placed in removal proceedings, criminal convictions have a 
significant impact on the outcome of a person’s case. Regardless of the 
Supreme Court’s stance that deportation is not “punishment,” the Court has 
long recognized, nonetheless, that deportation is often a penalty that flows 
directly from criminal activity.131 In fact, in Padilla v. Kentucky, the Court 
acknowledged that a person may well see deportation as “an integral part—
indeed, sometimes the most important part—of the penalty that may be 
imposed on noncitizen defendants who plead guilty to specified crimes.”132  
The sheer number of removal cases involving people with criminal 
convictions shows the overlap between the criminal and immigration 
enforcement systems. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
specifically collects data regarding the number of noncitizens removed who 
have criminal convictions. In 2017, removals of “non-criminals” (174,063) 
outnumbered removals of “criminals” (121,301),133 as they have every year 
since 2004.134 According to a Pew Research report, arrests of people with 
no prior criminal convictions rose 146% from 2016 to 2017.135 Even DHS’s 
proclamation that 121,301 “criminals” were removed obscures some of the 
truth in that it may play on stereotypes and harmful rhetoric regarding 
 
128. Chapin, supra note 24, at 144–57. 
129. Id. at 123, 148. 
130. Id. at 148. 
131. Kanstroom, supra note 21, at 606 n.39 (“[Deportation] visits a great hardship on the 
individual and deprives him of the right to stay and live and work in this land of freedom. That 
deportation is a penalty—at times a most serious one—cannot be doubted.” (quoting Bridges v. Wixon, 
326 U.S. 135, 154 (1945))).  
132. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 364 (2010). 
133. Table 41. Aliens Removed by Criminal Status and Region and Country of Nationality: Fiscal 
Year 2017, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., https://www.dhs.gov/immigration-statistics/yearbook/2017/tabl 
e41 (last updated Apr. 9, 2019) [https://perma.cc/LUF3-2QWG].  
134. See Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., https://www.dhs.gov/im 
migration-statistics/yearbook# (last updated Jan. 6, 2020) [https://perma.cc/MGJ5-M4U5]. 
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Change from 2009, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Feb. 15, 2018), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/02/1 
5/most-immigrants-arrested-by-ice-have-prior-criminal-convictions-a-big-change-from-2009 [https://p 
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immigrants. People reviewing that data might presume that these 
“criminals” were convicted of rape, murder, or other violent crimes. To the 
contrary, 29.2% (35,385 people) of the “criminal aliens” removed in 2017 
had been convicted of immigration-related crimes such as illegal entry or 
reentry. 136  14.5% of the “criminals” were in the category “Traffic 
Offenses,” which includes driving under the influence and lesser traffic 
crimes such as driving without insurance.137  
In Padilla v. Kentucky, the United States Supreme Court summarized 
changes in immigration law that led to the contemporary intimate 
relationship between criminal convictions and deportation.138  The Court 
noted that, over the last century, classes of deportable offenses broadened 
vastly while the authority of criminal court judges to exercise their 
discretion to halt deportations through a procedure called a judicial 
recommendation against deportation (JRAD) shrank and then 
disappeared.139 
More recently, the various Attorneys General (AG) during the Trump 
administration accelerated the practice of referring cases to themselves in 
order to create binding precedent.140 These decisions have expanded the 
immigration consequences for criminal convictions. One example is the 
Matter of Castillo-Perez, where the AG decided that two or more 
convictions for driving under the influence (DUI) during the statutory 
period would presumptively indicate that the person lacks good moral 
character, and that evidence of rehabilitation is insufficient to overcome the 
presumption.141 Thus, two DUIs, even of a non-aggravated nature, would 
result in a denial of relief. 
3. Proliferation of Civil Immigration Detention 
Along with increased enforcement and penalties for convictions comes 
increased use of detention. Scholars have noted that the fact that people are 
 
136. KATHERINE WITSMAN, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., ANNUAL REPORT: IMMIGRATION 
ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2017, at 13 (2019), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/enfor 
cement_actions_2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/3YZX-HAYJ]. 
137. Id. See Annie Lai, Confronting Proxy Criminalization, 92 DENV. U. L. REV. 879 (2015), for 
a discussion of how states have used driver’s license schemes to punish undocumented status. 
138. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 360 (2010). 
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140. The referral authority was rarely used; for example, the Obama administration used the 
authority four times in eight years, yet the Trump administration had already used referral authority 
twelve times within the first three years. Brittany Stevenson, Building Legal Walls: Limiting Attorney 
General Referral Authority over Immigration Cases, 81 OHIO ST. L.J. 315, 317 (2020). 












physically confined during removal proceedings exposes the punitive nature 
of immigration detention.142  
The phrase “immigrant detention” encompasses for-profit private 
detention centers run by ICE nationwide, as well as prisons and jails that 
incarcerate civil immigration detainees along with people in criminal 
custody.143 In the 1980s, less than 2,000 people were held in detention.144 
By 2019, the number rose to an average of 50,165 people.145 And for fiscal 
year 2021, ICE sought $4.1 billion for the detention system with the goal of 
expanding capacity to 60,000 people detained every day.146 ICE’s stated 
mission is to “expand aggressive interior enforcement within the United 
States, double the use of family detention, apply more stringent application 
of parole criteria to people eligible for release from detention, and reenroll 
more non-citizen records in the National Crime Information Center . . . 
database, which will result in more immigrants being referred to ICE 
through the criminal justice system.”147 The use of private detention centers 
in particular has also expanded under the current administration, with the 
opening of over forty new immigration detention centers since 2017.148  
Moreover, these rising numbers of people in detention reflect other 
systemic practices contributing to prolonged detention. As noted by Justice 
Breyer, noncitizens today might spend from 305 days to four years in ICE 
custody before ultimately winning their cases. 149  Some noncitizens are 
subject to mandatory detention if they have “committed” (as opposed to 
being convicted of) certain offenses listed in various subsections of the 
immigration statute.150 These offenses can include crimes like “shoplifting, 
petty theft, drunk driving, and even low-level drug violations.”151  
 
142. See, e.g., Jennifer M. Chacón, Immigration Detention: No Turning Back?, 113 S. ATL. Q. 
621, 623 (2014) (“The glaring problem with the legal doctrine that constructs immigration detention as 
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César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Immigration Detention as Punishment, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1346, 
1349–50 (2014) (“Whatever the actual reason for detention and despite immigration detention's legal 
characterization as civil, individuals in immigration confinement are frequently perceived to be no 
different than individuals in penal confinement.”). 
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Increasing bond amounts also contribute to noncitizens’ prolonged 
detention. Syracuse University’s Transactional Records Access 
Clearinghouse, which has tracked bond amounts, reported that bonds set by 
immigration judges were all under $2,000 in 2005, yet 40% of bonds in 
2018 were $10,000 or more.152 
Remaining in detention during the pendency of removal proceedings 
affects every aspect of a noncitizen’s case. While a noncitizen is detained, 
they cannot be gainfully employed, nor can they obtain documentation from 
outside sources that is necessary for their case. Notably, being detained may 
affect a person’s ability to hire a lawyer.153 Thus, for people who do not 
have family members to advocate for them, it is exceedingly difficult to win 
their cases.154 
The proliferation of immigration detention highlights its punitive nature 
and further exemplifies the necessity of expanding procedural protections.  
4. Federal Immigration Crimes 
Another trend demonstrating the criminalization of immigration is the 
increasing criminal prosecution of noncitizens for immigration-related 
violations. Unauthorized entry became a crime at the behest of Senator 
Coleman Livingston Blease in 1929. 155  Blease, a notorious white 
supremacist,156 sought to turn the civil offense of unlawful entry into the 
country into a misdemeanor, and reentry to the U.S. following a prior 
deportation into a felony.157 The plan was strategic in continuing to permit 
lawful Mexican immigrants to provide cheap labor in the fields, while 
permitting the U.S. to cut off the flow at ports of entry as needed.158 Blease’s 
 
152. Stef W. Kight & Felix Salmon, The Cost of Bail for Immigrants Is Surging, AXIOS (Jul. 21, 
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bill, the Immigration Act of 1929, passed and became Sections 1325 and 
1326 of Title 8 of the U.S. Code.159 
Section 1325 currently criminalizes the following:  
“Any alien who (1) enters or attempts to enter the United States at 
any time or place other than as designated by immigration officers, 
or (2) eludes examination or inspection by immigration officers, or 
(3) attempts to enter or obtains entry to the United States by a 
willfully false or misleading representation or the willful 
concealment of a material fact . . . .”160 
The penalties associated with these entries or attempts to enter are a fine and 
up to six months imprisonment for the first offense, and a fine and up to two 
years’ imprisonment for subsequent offenses.161  
Section 1326 prohibits unlawful reentry of noncitizens previously 
removed. In essence, a noncitizen who “has been denied admission, 
excluded, deported, or removed or has departed the United States while an 
order of exclusion, deportation, or removal is outstanding” is subject to 
federal criminal prosecution if they enter, attempt to enter, or are discovered 
to be present anywhere inside the United States.162 The penalty for illegal 
reentry under § 1326(a) is a fine or no more than two years of 
imprisonment.163 However, there are heightened penalties of up to twenty 
years of imprisonment if the person was convicted of certain crimes before 
being removed.164 
Prosecutions of federal immigration violations, most notably illegal 
entry, reentry, and alien smuggling, are on the rise.165  Prosecutions for 
immigration offenses overshadow other types of federal offenses. In 2019, 
immigration-related prosecutions comprised 38.4% of all people sentenced 
under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, 166  and drug-related prosecutions 
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comprised 26.6% of those sentenced. 167  Prosecutions of immigration 
offenses rose 22.9% from fiscal year 2018.168  A press release from the 
Department of Justice Office of Public Affairs announced that “U.S. 
Attorneys’ Offices prosecuted the highest number of immigration-related 
offenses since record keeping began more than twenty-five years ago.”169 
The press release boasts 25,426 defendants accused of felony illegal reentry, 
80,866 charged with misdemeanor improper entry, and 4,297 defendants 
charged with alien smuggling.170 The announcement attributes the DOJ’s 
self-proclaimed success to “restored essential partnerships with national, 
state and local law-enforcement partners.”171 
There have been calls to decriminalize both illegal entry and illegal 
reentry. For example, in the Democratic primaries leading up to the 2020 
presidential election, several presidential hopefuls, including Julián Castro, 
Elizabeth Warren, and Pete Buttigieg, endorsed the idea of striking Section 
1325 in its entirety.172 One of the rationales for decriminalizing is that the 
Trump administration has relied on the fact that migrant parents are 
prosecuted to justify separating them from their children, who are not 
allowed in criminal custody. 173  Additionally, then-California Attorney 
General Xavier Becerra has stated that enforcing the civil laws by imposing 
civil penalties is sufficient for people who cross the border without 
authorization because “[t]hey haven’t committed a crime against someone, 
and they are not acting violently or in a way that’s harmful to people.”174 
Scholars have also called for decriminalization of border crossings.175 
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III. ASPECTS OF THE SELF-INCRIMINATION ANALYSIS IN THE 
IMMIGRATION CONTEXT 
In order to explore the application of the right against self-incrimination 
in immigration cases, it is first important to understand how the removal 
process functions. Removal proceedings consist of distinct stages. 176 
Immigration courts are administrative courts that are part of the executive 
branch, under the umbrella of the Department of Justice.177 DHS first files 
a Notice to Appear with the Executive Office for Immigration Review 
(EOIR) in order to initiate proceedings against a noncitizen. 178  After a 
decision is rendered in immigration court, an appeal may be made to the 
Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), a reviewing body that decides appeals 
in removal and bond proceedings, as well as other related proceedings such 
as disciplinary cases against legal representatives.179 The BIA may choose 
to make a decision that is binding nationwide,180 or it may certify a case for 
review by the Attorney General. 181  The federal circuit courts have 
jurisdiction to review BIA decisions where cases involve constitutional 
questions or questions of law.182 A noncitizen (or the government) may file 
a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court following the decision of the 
federal circuit court.  
The next section explores how scenarios concerning potential self-
incrimination arise and why the noncitizen’s incentive to plead the Fifth 
varies depending on the context. 
A. General Rules on Self-Incrimination in Removal Proceedings 
As in other civil proceedings, noncitizens in immigration court may 
choose not to testify in response to “any question he reasonably believe[s] 
might have a tendency to incriminate him or furnish proof of a link in a 
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chain of evidence.”183 Thus, testimony may not be taken if the noncitizen 
has a valid claim of self-incrimination.184  
However, as with defendants in criminal proceedings, noncitizens’ 
silence can be rendered unprivileged if the immigration judge compels them 
to testify, meaning that the witness may be ordered to answer a question or 
be held in contempt. A noncitizen may be compelled to testify regardless of 
their “mental capacity, language skills, or general competence.” 185  One 
scenario in which the immigration judge can compel testimony, despite an 
assertion of the right against self-incrimination, is where there is an offer of 
immunity.186 However, the DHS attorney or the immigration judge lack the 
authority to offer immunity; rather, immunity must be offered by the 
Attorney General or officers designated by them.187 An obvious gap in this 
type of immunity that could cause problems later for the noncitizen is that 
the Attorney General cannot immunize someone from being prosecuted 
under state or local criminal laws. 
Absent a court order compelling a noncitizen to testify, there is still a 
disincentive to remain silent in immigration court because there are direct 
negative consequences—specifically, the potential of an adverse inference.  
As in other civil proceedings, there is no prohibition on immigration 
judges drawing an adverse inference when a noncitizen chooses to plead the 
Fifth during court.188 The Immigration Judge Benchbook, citing Supreme 
Court, Ninth Circuit, and BIA cases, describes the potential effect of an 
adverse inference after being confronted with evidence: “Even if the refusal 
to testify is based on the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination, the refusal forms the basis of an inference and such inference 
is evidence.”189  
Another way of articulating how adverse inferences work was stated in 
a case where the respondent refused to testify regarding whether he was a 
member of the Communist Party, after the government presented a prima 
 
183. Matter of Carrillo, 17 I&N Dec. 30, 33 (BIA 1979) (citing Matter of R-, 4 I&N Dec. 720, 
721 (BIA 1952)). 
184. Matter of Laqui, 13 I&N Dec. 232, 234 (BIA 1969), aff’d, Laqui v. INS, 422 F.2d 807, 809–
10 (7th Cir. 1970). 
185. N.Y. IMMIGR. REPRESENTATION, ACCESSING JUSTICE II: A MODEL FOR PROVIDING 
COUNSEL TO NEW YORK IMMIGRANTS IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS 7 (Dec. 2012), https://law.yale.edu/si 
tes/default/files/area/center/liman/document/nyirs_reportii.pdf [https://perma.cc/ST2G-26SK]; see also 
Careen Shannon, Immigration Is Different: Why Congress Should Guarantee Access to Counsel in All 
Immigration Matters, 17 U. D.C. L. REV. 165, 173 (2014).  
186. Carrillo, 17 I&N Dec. at 33. 
187. Id. 
188. U.S. ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149, 154 (1923) (“There is no provision which 
forbids drawing an adverse inference from the fact of standing mute.”). 
189. EXEC. OFF. OF IMMIGR. REV., IMMIGRATION JUDGE BENCHBOOK: EVIDENCE 21 (2007), https 
://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/988046/download [https://perma.cc/6HLM-2WNH] [hereinafter 












facie case of deportability: “What then is the logical conclusion to be drawn 
from the silence of one who claims his answer may subject him to possible 
prosecution or punishment for violation of a Federal law? Our reading of 
the authorities reveals the inference is that the testimony withheld would be 
adverse to the interests of the person claiming the privilege.”190 Thus, the 
noncitizen’s silence led to an inference of guilt. 
The lesson here is that, when a person chooses to remain silent in the 
face of evidence of alienage, removability, or circumstances of their 
entrance to the United States, the immigration judge is empowered to draw 
adverse inferences, which then will likely lead to a finding of deportability 
or denial of relief.191 
B. Testimonial Pitfalls in Immigration Court Hearings 
Self-incrimination is at issue in two different ways during immigration 
proceedings. First, a noncitizen may be asked to testify about facts relating 
to their immigration status,192 which could lead to new criminal charges for 
violations where the individual’s “alien” status is a necessary component of 
the crime. Second, a noncitizen may be asked to testify about alleged 
criminal conduct—unrelated to immigration status—in a pending criminal 
case, or in such a way that raises the possibility of future criminal 
prosecution.193  
Allocation of the burden of proof has a heavy bearing on whether it is in 
the noncitizen’s interest to “plead the Fifth,” because sometimes the benefits 
of staying silent often do not outweigh the benefits of speech. This is 
particularly true for noncitizens who lack legal status. Where a party bears 
the burden of proof, invocation of the Fifth Amendment does not relieve 
that party of the burden.194 For example, where a noncitizen is required to 
show eligibility for relief,195 there is no incentive to remain silent because a 
lack of evidence will result in the denial of relief. But where a lawful 
permanent resident is charged with removability, the government bears the 
burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the person is 
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government. ABA TREATISE, supra note 48, at 25 (citing United States v. Rylander, 460 U.S. 752, 758 
(1983)). 
195. Matter of Y-, 7 I&N Dec. 697, 699 (BIA 1958). 











deportable as charged.196 Thus, the noncitizen may have an incentive to 
exercise their Fifth Amendment right because their silence cannot be used 
against them if the government has not submitted its own proof.197 Given 
complicated schemes of shifting burdens of proof depending on the type of 
hearing, this problem arises frequently in immigration court and applies 
differently in various situations.  
1. Testimony Relating to Immigration Status 
In all removal proceedings, the government bears the initial burden of 
establishing alienage. 198  However, a noncitizen’s own testimony is 
sufficient to prove alienage, and the taking of such testimony has been held 
to not violate due process.199 Agency regulations specifically provide that 
the respondent (who is always the noncitizen) can admit the factual 
allegations and removability and the immigration judge “may determine 
that removability as charged has been established by the admissions of the 
respondent,” except that the judge may not accept admissions from 
unrepresented respondents who are incompetent or under the age of 18 
without the presence of “an attorney or legal representative, a near relative, 
legal guardian, or friend.”200  
The fact that noncitizens are casually and frequently asked about their 
immigration status, without any sort of warning with respect to self-
incrimination, is troubling because alienage is an element of various federal 
criminal statutes. For example, only “aliens” can be convicted of illegal 
entry and reentry.201  One of the elements in the Ninth Circuit’s Model 
Criminal Jury Instructions for illegal reentry is that “the defendant was an 
alien at the time of reentry,” which is defined as “a person who is not a 
natural-born or naturalized citizen of the United States.”202 Thus, alienage 
is obviously a link in the chain of evidence proving the federal immigration 
crimes of illegal entry and reentry. Immigration judges have to ascertain the 
 
196. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(a) (2020). 
197. See, e.g., Duvall v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 436 F.3d 382 (3d Cir. 2006) (describing deportation 
proceedings of a lawful permanent resident who asserted her right against self-incrimination with respect 
to place of birth and citizenship). The government’s other evidence was ruled inadmissible and the 
immigration judge therefore terminated proceedings due to the government’s failure to meet its burden. 
Id. 
198. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(a) (burden is on the government to prove “by clear and convincing 
evidence that the respondent is deportable as charged”); 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(c) (burden is on the 
government to “first establish the alienage of the respondent” before shifting burden to the noncitizen). 
199. Matter of Laqui, 13 I&N Dec. 232, 234 (BIA 1969), aff’d, Laqui v. INS, 422 F.2d 807, 809–
10 (7th Cir. 1970). 
200. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10(c). 
201. 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a); 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). 
202. See, e.g., NINTH CIR. JURY INSTRUCTIONS COMM., MANUAL OF MODEL CRIMINAL JURY 












likelihood that the person could actually be prosecuted, including 
consideration of the statute of limitations.203 And, given the data discussed 
above showing rising numbers of federal prosecutions over recent years, it 
is realistic to expect prosecution of federal immigration-related crimes if the 
five-year statute of limitations has not expired.204  
Both the initial interrogation, which is akin to a pretrial interrogation in 
the criminal context, and the court hearing itself can present highly coercive 
circumstances, particularly where the noncitizen is pro se. 205  These 
problems are amplified due to the power dynamics inside courtrooms, 
especially where a noncitizen is unrepresented and not even aware of their 
right against self-incrimination to begin with.  
a. In-Court Testimony 
During court, DHS often easily meets its burden of establishing alienage 
because it is permitted to question the noncitizen directly. 206  In some 
circumstances, the immigration judge may ask the questions. There is a 
combination of two questions that generally can establish alienage: “Are 
you claiming U.S. citizenship?” and “Where were you born?” 207  Once 
answered, the government’s initial burden is met and the burden shifts to 
the noncitizen to justify their presence in the United States or otherwise seek 
relief.208  
Noncitizens may have a strong interest in choosing to remain silent in 
response to such questioning. As in other civil proceedings, the witness’s 
silence alone is insufficient for the government to prove its case. In Matter 
of Guevara, the respondent refused to answer any questions that did not 
pertain to his identity, claiming his privilege against self-incrimination. 209 
The Government had only submitted into evidence the Order to Show 
Cause, which contained allegations, but did not submit any other evidence 
 
203. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951). 
204. 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a) (providing general federal statute of limitations, which applies to all 
non-capital offenses, is five years from the date the offense was committed). It remains to be seen 
whether rates of criminal prosecutions of immigration law violations will change under the Biden 
Administration. While President Biden has pledged to “end[] the prosecution of parents for minor 
immigration violations as an intimidation tactic” during his first 100 days, that is a rather limited 
statement, and he has not indicated that he would otherwise scale back criminal prosecutions. See The 
Biden Plan for Securing Our Values as a Nation of Immigrants, BIDEN HARRIS, https://joebiden.com/im 
migration [https://perma.cc/QR2Q-ZSNT].  
205. Chan, supra note 22, at 298; see also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 448 (1966) 
(“[C]oercion can be mental as well as physical, and that the blood of the accused is not the only hallmark 
of an unconstitutional inquisition.” (quoting Blackburn v. State of Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 206 (1960))). 
206. Matter of Carrillo, 17 I&N Dec. 30, 32 (BIA 1979). 
207. This is based on the author’s own observations while representing noncitizens in immigration 
court hearings. See also Chan, supra note 22, at 293.  
208. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(c) (2020). 
209. Matter of Guevara, 20 I&N Dec. 238, 239 (BIA 1991). 











regarding the respondent’s place of birth, changes of status, or any other 
information required to shift the burden to the respondent.210 The BIA held 
that, because the Government bore the burden of proof in deportation 
proceedings to establish alienage, “the respondent’s silence alone does not 
provide sufficient evidence, in the absence of any other evidence of record 
at all, to establish a prima facie case of alienage.”211 
Additionally, because DHS bears the burden of proving alienage, the 
noncitizen simply may wish to put the government to its proof. This is 
particularly so where the noncitizen is not eligible for any forms of relief, 
or where constitutional violations led to the attainment of the evidence. In 
those instances, the noncitizen is entitled to challenge the violation in court, 
either by filing a motion to suppress the evidence or a motion to terminate 
the proceedings entirely.212 
However, the attempt to refuse to speak may not be fruitful in practice, 
because relevant information may have been obtained before coming to 
court, which is discussed in the next section. 
b. Pre-Removal Proceeding Interrogations/Encounters 
Although the focus of this Article is on the right against self-
incrimination within the immigration court setting, a discussion of 
noncitizens’ rights during interrogations that occur prior to the 
commencement of removal proceedings is warranted because the evidence 
may later be introduced in court. This issue may arise during border stops, 
scenarios treated like border stops, or when a person is apprehended by the 
Department of Homeland Security following a criminal arrest or otherwise.  
Pre-removal proceeding interrogations are not subject to the same, albeit 
limited, protections as criminal pretrial interrogations.213 Some warnings 
are required when a person is arrested without a warrant. The person must 
be: (1) told the reasons for the arrest, (2) told their right to be represented at 
no cost to the government, (3) advised that any statement made may be used 
against them in a future proceeding, and (4) given a list of free legal 
services.214 Yet, Miranda warnings are not required, even in circumstances 
 
210. Id. at 244. 
211. Id. at 242. 
212. AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, MOTIONS TO SUPPRESS IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS: A GENERAL 
OVERVIEW (2017), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/practice_advisory/ 
motions_to_suppress_in_removal_proceedings_a_general_overview.pdf [https://perma.cc/NYC4-2PT 
D]. 
213. For an in-depth discussion of this topic, see Chan, supra note 22. 












where the lack of warnings would render the statements inadmissible in 
criminal court.215  
A recent decision from the Washington Supreme Court indicates a 
potential change, at least in that jurisdiction, in the scope of Miranda’s 
application in pre-removal proceeding interrogations. In State v. Escalante, 
the Washington Supreme Court recognized that questioning at the border is 
typically not “custody” for Miranda purposes, yet stated: 
Escalante was separated from the normal stream of traffic and routed 
to a secondary inspection area, which would cause a reasonable 
person to feel subject to an increased level of suspicion. At 
secondary, agents separated him from all his belongings, confiscated 
his documents, subjected him to a pat-down search, and detained him 
for five hours in a locked 11 x 14 foot lobby that was inaccessible to 
the public or other travelers. . . . Escalante was not allowed to leave 
the lobby or to freely use the bathroom or access water.216 
The court held that these particular facts during Escalante’s border detention 
constituted an “inherently coercive environment that demands Miranda 
warnings to ensure an individual’s choice to speak is the product of free 
will” and that Escalante was in custody when he was interrogated. 217 
Escalante further highlights the intensively fact-dependent inquiry in which 
courts engage to determine whether an interrogation was “custodial.” While 
this case represents a positive shift toward protecting the rights of 
noncitizens, it is unclear whether other jurisdictions will follow suit. 
Part of these pre-removal proceedings encounters involves the 
preparation of certain documents. Before attempting to initiate removal 
proceedings, DHS must gather information to form the basis of the Notice 
to Appear, which charges the noncitizen as removable and provides factual 
allegations supporting the charges. Thus, during the initial encounter with a 
noncitizen, ICE officers conduct an interrogation and fill out the Form I-
213, Record of Deportable/Inadmissible Alien.218 The I-213 includes all 
biographical data, including information about place of birth and last entry 
to the United States, a photograph and fingerprints, criminal history, a 
 
215. See United States v. Alderete-Deras, 743 F.2d 645, 648 (9th Cir. 1984) (“Although a lack of 
Miranda warnings might render his statements inadmissible in a criminal prosecution for violation of 
the immigration laws, the failure to give Miranda warnings did not render them inadmissible in 
deportation proceedings.” (citing Chavez-Raya v. INS, 519 F.2d 397, 402 (7th Cir. 1975))). 
216. State v. Escalante, 461 P.3d 1183, 1192 (Wash. 2020).  
217. Id. at 1187.  
218. It is not necessary that the noncitizen participate in the process of creating the Form I-213. 
For example, in Findley, the noncitizen had objected to the reliability of the I-213 because none of its 
information came from him and was largely based on hearsay from his relatives. Matter of Findley, 2017 
WL 1130670, at *1 (BIA Jan. 31, 2017). The BIA noted that “the Federal Rules of Evidence do not 
apply in immigration proceedings, and hearsay is admissible.” Id. at *3. 











description of the encounter between ICE and the noncitizen, and any other 
information that the noncitizen divulges during the interrogation.219 The I-
213 is signed by the deportation officer who conducted the interrogation and 
constitutes an official record that is presumptively admissible later on in 
court, even though it is hearsay.220  
Noncitizens may challenge the I-213, but the available challenges are 
limited. The BIA has held that Form I-213’s are inherently trustworthy and 
admissible, unless the noncitizen can prove that it contains incorrect 
information, or the information was obtained by coercion or duress.221 The 
Second Circuit has added that the I-213 can be admitted in removal 
proceedings without giving the noncitizen a chance to cross-examine the 
preparer because of the form’s presumptive reliability, at least if no other 
evidence has been put forward to bring the contents of the I-213 into 
question.222 In fact, the Supreme Court has noted that officers who prepare 
the I-213s “rarely must attend the hearing.”223 Moreover, if the noncitizen 
previously admitted alienage when pleadings were taken, any attempt to 
suppress that information will have been foiled. All of these factors make 
the likelihood of succeeding on a challenge to the I-213 very low. 
2. Testimony Relating to Other Pending or Potential Criminal 
Charges 
Noncitizens are also placed in a difficult position when asked to testify 
about criminal conduct, whether in federal or state court, and whether 
alleged or convicted. The concern with this type of testimony is that the 
prosecutor in the criminal case could obtain the testimony given in 
immigration court and use that in the criminal case or to initiate a new 
criminal case.224 A first consideration is the status of the criminal case. For 
example, if the criminal case has concluded entirely, then there will 
generally be no Fifth Amendment right to silence because there is no danger 
 
219. A sample Form I-213 is available on the Catholic Legal Immigration Network’s website at: 
Practitioners’ Guide to Obtaining Release From Immigration Detention, CLINIC (May 24, 2018), https:// 
cliniclegal.org/resources/enforcement-and-detention/practitioners-guide-obtaining-release-immigration 
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220. Bauge v. INS, 7 F.3d 1540, 1543 (10th Cir. 1993); Findley, 2017 WL 1130670, at *1. 
221. Findley, 2017 WL 1130670, at *1 (quoting Matter of Gomez-Gomez, 23 I&N Dec. 522, 524 
(BIA 2002)); United States v. Alderete-Deras, 743 F.2d 645, 648 (9th Cir. 1984) (stating that lack of 
Miranda warnings did not render statements inadmissible in deportation proceedings, even if they may 
be inadmissible in criminal proceedings, unless coercion or other improper behavior was shown). 
222. Felzcerek v. INS, 75 F.3d 112, 117 (2d Cir. 1996). 
223. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1049 (1984).  
224. It is common practice for federal prosecutors to obtain portions of immigration files in order 
to support charges for immigration-related offenses. Telephone Interview with Christina Sinha, Esq., 












that the testimony will be used against the noncitizen.225 However, if the 
criminal case concluded but is on appeal and may be remanded for a new 
trial, it is imperative that the right against self-incrimination be preserved. 
Additionally, some noncitizens may have criminal cases that simply have 
not resolved at all, such as where they are transferred to immigration 
detention before the conclusion of criminal proceedings. Lastly, noncitizens 
may have to weigh the possibility that they could be newly charged with a 
crime following immigration proceedings if their testimony implicates them 
in criminal activity. 
For those who have pending charges, the possibility of a new trial, or 
potential future charges, one strategy available to the noncitizen is to ask for 
a lengthy continuance that would allow for the criminal investigation or 
proceeding to conclude prior to giving any testimony. However, the BIA 
has imposed significant limitations on motions to continue. 226  Where 
immigration judges previously could grant continuances for good cause, 
Matter of L-A-B-R- now imposes a two-part test in circumstances where the 
noncitizen is seeking resolution of a collateral matter: the noncitizen has to 
prove that (1) they are likely to receive the collateral relief, and (2) the 
collateral relief is material to the outcome of the removal proceedings.227 
Additionally, efforts to obtain lengthy continuances to resolve criminal 
proceedings may not be successful due to the imposition of stringent case 
quotas for immigration judges.228 Continuances also may not be palatable 
from the perspective of the noncitizen, particularly those who are detained 
during the pendency of proceedings. 
The incentives regarding whether to speak or not are oftentimes murky, 
particularly to a noncitizen proceeding pro se. On one hand, immigration 
judges treat speech that attempts to explain or rationalize criminal conduct 
as entirely irrelevant because guilt or innocence was decided by the criminal 
court and therefore is outside the purview of immigration court 
proceedings.229 Yet, that is not always the case. For example, on making a 
determination of whether a crime qualifies as a “particularly serious crime” 
barring someone from asylum, “all reliable information may be considered 
 
225. There must be “some tangible and substantial probability” that the testimony could lead to a 
conviction. Matter of R-, 4 I&N Dec. 720, 721 (BIA 1952). 
226. Matter of L-A-B-R-, 27 I&N Dec. 405 (A.G. 2018). 
227. Id. at 406. 
228. Immigration judges are increasingly unwilling to grant continuances because they are subject 
to quotas, tight timelines to conclude cases, and have less discretion to manage their own dockets. 
Priscilla Alvarez, Immigration Judges Quit in Response to Administration Policies, CNN (Dec. 27, 2019, 
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of the criminal judge and reassess any ruling on criminal culpability.”), vacated sub nom. Gomez-
Sanchez v. Sessions, 892 F.3d 985 (9th Cir. 2018). 











in making a particularly serious crime determination, including the 
conviction records and sentencing information, as well as other information 
outside the confines of a record of conviction.”230 Noncitizens must choose, 
often without the benefit of advice from counsel, whether to potentially give 
damning testimony that could affect their criminal case or remain silent and 
risk an adverse inference in their removal hearing. 
The REAL ID Act of 2005 placed the burden on the noncitizen to prove 
eligibility for relief from removal. 231  “Relief from removal” includes 
asylum, withholding of removal, relief under the Convention against 
Torture, adjustment of status, cancellation of removal, voluntary departure, 
and waivers of grounds of inadmissibility or deportability. If a noncitizen 
asserts that they were lawfully admitted, they must show that the admission 
was lawful by clear and convincing evidence. 232  Additionally, if a 
noncitizen with legal status is found deportable, the noncitizen bears the 
burden to establish eligibility for any relief sought.233  
In situations where the burden is on the noncitizen, they must either 
answer any inquiries asked of them or risk the immigration judge drawing 
an adverse inference. In a case where the immigration judge refused to 
consider the respondent’s application for discretionary relief because the 
respondent decided to remain silent, the BIA held that that was improper 
retaliation. 234  Nonetheless, an adverse inference about criminal conduct 
may be drawn, ultimately leading the immigration judge to deny relief 
because they refuse to exercise discretion favorably to the noncitizen who 
appears to be hiding something, even if they have a constitutional right to 
do so. 235 Another type of adverse inference may be drawn that establishes 
an element necessary to find a person deportable or statutorily ineligible for 
relief, resulting in deportation.236  
Troublingly, in certain circumstances it appears that courts take silence 
as an outright admission of guilt, which is a step further than drawing an 
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adjustment of status where he refused to testify concerning prior false claims); Matter of Li, 15 I&N 
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adverse inference after the government has provided probative evidence.237 
In Gutierrez v. Holder, the immigration judge asked the noncitizen whether 
he was driving on a suspended license, to which his attorney responded that 
Mr. Gutierrez was invoking his right to remain silent.238 The immigration 
judge made a finding that “the respondent [was] currently still driving even 
on a suspended driver’s license.”239 On his petition for review, the Ninth 
Circuit made a blanket statement that the immigration judge “was permitted 
to draw an adverse inference when Gutierrez refused to answer whether he 
was driving on a suspended license.”240  Thus, it appears that the court 
accepted that, even though there was no other evidence discussed regarding 
whether Mr. Gutierrez was driving on a suspended license at the time, Mr. 
Gutierrez’s silence constituted an admission. 
Another layer of this complex puzzle is that the standards set out by 
federal courts, including the Supreme Court, have been confused by the 
agency. As a prime example, in a 2017 case, the BIA applied a heightened 
standard by stating that the Fifth Amendment does not protect testimony 
unless such testimony would unequivocally subject the noncitizen to 
criminal prosecution: 
[C]ompelling a person to answer a question in a removal 
proceeding regarding where he was born does not violate the Fifth 
Amendment’s protection against self-incrimination because the 
question is too attenuated to whether someone entered the United 
States illegally in order that he could be subject to criminal 
prosecution. For example, if the respondent had entered pursuant to 
a properly acquired visa, his answer about where he was born would 
not have incriminated him because overstaying a visa is not a crime. 
In addition, there is no evidence that the respondent is being 
considered for criminal prosecution for unlawful entry, and his 
contentions in this regard on appeal are purely hypothetical and 
speculative.241 
However, the standard is not that a person must certainly be facing criminal 
prosecution in order to invoke the Fifth Amendment. Rather, the noncitizen 
must simply reasonably believe that the evidence might tend to incriminate 
 
237. Normally, adverse inferences should only be permitted where the government has first 
presented evidence. Matter of Guevara, 20 I&N Dec. 238, 241–42 (BIA 1991) (collecting cases). 
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him, or furnish proof of a link in a chain of evidence.242 Here, plainly, a 
person admitting that they were born elsewhere provides a link in the chain 
of evidence that a person is an “alien,” which is an element of illegal entry. 
Additionally, simply because other people (such as visa holders) would not 
be incriminated by admitting where they were born does not mean that it 
would not provide a “link” for others. Lastly, there is no requirement that a 
person be presently “considered for criminal prosecution” in order to assert 
the Fifth Amendment—rather, the right is properly invoked when the person 
might be incriminated in future criminal proceedings.243 As these cases 
demonstrate, choosing to plead the Fifth can bear harsh consequences and 
the right itself is applied unevenly. 
C. A Legal Gray Area: Bond Proceedings 
A developing issue is which party bears the burden of proof during bond 
proceedings, the process through which detained noncitizens seek release 
from immigration custody. Bond proceedings are treated as entirely separate 
proceedings from the main removal hearing process. 244  Although it is 
ultimately the government’s burden to show that a person is deportable 
(where a person was lawfully admitted or currently has legal status) and an 
alien (where a person is charged as present without being admitted or 
paroled),245 the burden in bond proceedings is distinct. In 1976, the BIA 
declared that the burden of proof was with the government, as there should 
be a presumption against detention.246 In 1999, the BIA reversed itself and 
held that the noncitizen would shoulder the burden of proving that “his 
release would not pose a danger to property or persons and that he is likely 
to appear for any future proceedings.”247  
Thus, the BIA currently holds that the burden is on the respondent to 
prove that they are not dangerous and not a flight risk. 248  However, 
increasing numbers of federal courts are finding that the burden of proof 
 
242. Matter of Carrillo, 17 I&N Dec. 30, 32–33 (BIA 1979) (citing Matter of R-, 4 I&N Dec. 720, 
721 (BIA 1952)). 
243. Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 316 (1976) (quoting Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 
77 (1973)). 
244. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(d) (2020) (stating that consideration of bond “shall be separate and apart 
from, and shall form no part of, any deportation or removal hearing or proceeding”). 
245. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(a) (burden is on the government to prove “by clear and convincing 
evidence that the respondent is deportable as charged”); 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(c) (burden is on the 
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rests with the government.249 Scholars were hopeful that the Supreme Court 
would address the burden issue in a recent case considering whether 
noncitizens subject to prolonged detention are entitled to a bond hearing.250 
The Court did not reach the issue.251 Thus, the burden of proof resting with 
the noncitizen in bond proceedings means the right against self-
incrimination has limited application in this context. 
Immigration judges continue to apply the BIA standard, which places the 
burden of proving non-dangerousness and lack of flight risk on the 
respondent.252 As part of that inquiry, respondents must provide proof of 
identity, including alienage. While evidence presented during bond 
proceedings “shall form no part of” the removal case in chief,253 evidence 
introduced in bond proceedings might be used in later criminal proceedings. 
Additionally, there remains a risk that the immigration judge could conclude 
that the noncitizen’s testimony in bond proceedings was tantamount to a 
waiver of the right against self-incrimination and compel them to testify in 
the removal case.254 Furthermore, the noncitizen will certainly be required 
to testify regarding any resolved and pending criminal matters to meet their 
burden of proving they are not dangerous. The decision to remain silent, 
while technically an option, will result in an adverse inference being drawn 
by the judge and ultimately may lead to an outright denial of bond.  
IV. DIAGNOSING THE PROBLEM  
In light of large-scale immigration enforcement and sweeping 
criminalization of “civil” immigration proceedings discussed supra in 
Section II, at first it may seem somewhat frivolous to discuss in-court 
procedural protections.255  Yet, constitutional provisions are meaningless 
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without procedural safeguards in place to ensure that such rights are 
protected.256 Indeed, the criminalization of immigration, a trend that the 
Supreme Court recognized in Padilla v. Kentucky, 257  makes fuller 
application of the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination in 
removal proceedings all the more appropriate.  
In criminal proceedings, procedural protections are understood to shield 
individuals from governmental abuse of power.258 In civil proceedings that 
occur between private parties, procedural protections support the idea that 
the correct outcome will be reached if the processes are fair, or support the 
legitimacy of a ruling’s authority even when an outcome is incorrect.259 
Immigration proceedings are somewhere between these two ends of the 
spectrum. As will be explored in this section, on one hand, these 
proceedings are currently categorized as “civil” in nature, but on the other 
hand, immigrants in removal proceedings are subjected to the coercive 
power of the government and are defending against deportation just as 
defendants in criminal proceedings are defending against convictions. 
Considering that an underlying principle of criminal procedure is to protect 
individuals against the government, it certainly appears that the same goal 
could be extended to immigration procedure. 
Existing applications of the right against self-incrimination in 
immigration court lack the nuance that the Fifth Amendment calls for. Thus, 
the procedures as they are currently utilized are not properly effectuating 
the substantive law, even under the current understanding that removal 
proceedings are “civil” in nature. Moreover, given the quasi-criminal nature 
of some removal proceedings, greater protections must also be recognized 
there. 
A. Why Protect the Right Against Self-Incrimination in the Removal 
Context? 
The reasons why the Self-Incrimination Clause should be expanded in 
this context can be broken down into three themes: (1) internal restraint, (2) 
individual dignity, and (3) external validation. Considering the heightened 
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the law scrupulously” and uphold the “decency, security, and liberty” of citizens). 












level of overlap between criminal and immigrant proceedings, and the fact 
that removal proceedings bear many of the trappings of the criminal process, 
the right against self-incrimination should serve the same purpose of 
protecting individuals against the coercive power of the government. 
Moreover, the right against self-incrimination protects the innocent as well 
as the guilty and upholds the dignity of individuals. Even short of valuing 
the protection of individual rights, procedural fairness legitimizes systems 
and enhances the public’s trust in the system, which leads to greater 
adherence to the law. 
1. Internal Restraint: Prevent Government Overreach  
The immigration system is rife with the possibility of government 
overreach. The plenary power doctrine has limited judicial review of the 
actions of the legislative and executive branches when it comes to 
immigration regulation. 260  This presents significant risk of overreach, 
particularly in a system in which the Federal Rules of Evidence do not 
apply, immigration judges are paid as government attorneys, and many 
people lack legal representation.  
In particular, procedural protections should be increased in removal 
proceedings where the proceedings take on an obviously quasi-criminal 
nature. The classification of certain civil proceedings as “quasi-criminal” is 
not a foreign concept to the Supreme Court. For example, in the civil 
forfeiture context, the Court analyzed the forfeiture statutes and concluded 
that the statutes “are intended to impose a penalty only upon those who are 
significantly involved in a criminal enterprise.”261 The Supreme Court then 
held that the right against self-incrimination fully applies in civil forfeiture 
proceedings.262  
Arguably, removal proceedings that are initiated because of criminal 
conduct—or where criminal convictions may lead to a finding of 
removability or statutory ineligibility for relief—indicate that deportation is 
in fact a penalty resulting directly from crime. Thus, removal proceedings 
may also be thought of as “quasi-criminal” under the definition articulated 
in the civil forfeiture context. 
At a minimum, there are certainly elements of removal proceedings 
following a criminal arrest that are quasi-criminal in nature. As the Supreme 
Court noted, criminal convictions and deportation have been “enmeshed” 
for a century, and “recent changes in our immigration law have made 
removal nearly an automatic result for a broad class of noncitizen 
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offenders.” 263  Transfer directly from criminal custody to immigration 
custody is an indication that the immigration proceedings are an extension 
of the criminal process, and that deportation is a penalty resulting from 
crimes. And the systems in place that are designed to enhance 
communication between local and state law enforcement with immigration 
authorities further ensure that removal proceedings will follow the criminal 
process. Even where this direct transfer does not happen, there is 
information sharing between the criminal and immigration processes.264 
Thus, even if someone is released from immigration custody, ICE may still 
discover the criminal conviction and locate them at a later time, showing up 
at their house or on their way to work to civilly arrest them. 
Some criminal courts also enmesh themselves in the immigration realm 
by inquiring about the immigration status of criminal defendants. For 
example, in Utah, the criminal courts enter orders specifically releasing 
defendants to ICE custody.265 Furthermore, they sometimes enter orders 
stating that defendants may not return to the country or state illegally. And 
when the defendant ends up in that jurisdiction again, they issue a 
warrant.266 
Moreover, removal proceedings operate similarly to prosecution, as they 
“primarily regulate the relationship between the state and the individual” 
and are a system of determining whether to include or exclude members of 
society, similar to criminal proceedings. 267  Particularly for detained 
noncitizens, immigration court looks strikingly similar to criminal court. 
There is a judge, the government is always represented by an attorney who 
is seeking to enforce the law, there are guards, and there are bond hearings 
to determine if the noncitizen should remain incarcerated, which involves 
an assessment of their dangerousness and risk of flight. Some immigration 
courts are located within detention centers. Some immigration courts 
require detainees to be shackled throughout their proceedings. Detainees 
wear color-coded jumpsuits to their court appearances.268  
The enforcement powers of the government are great and the power of 
individuals, particularly because the rates of representation by attorneys are 
so low,269 is miniscule. As one of the primary rationales for maintaining the 
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right against self-incrimination is to prevent government overreach, society 
has a strong interest in restricting the power of the government to compel a 
person to testify. 270  For the reasons discussed here, protections for 
noncitizens, particularly where their proceedings are of a quasi-criminal 
nature, are lagging. 
2. Individual Dignity  
A fundamental aspect of democratic societies is the protection of human 
rights, where dignity “constitutes the first cornerstone in the edifice of . . . 
human rights.” 271  While definitions and applications of the concept of 
“dignity” are varied, at a minimum it means that every person has intrinsic 
worth that should be protected from the will of others.272 Dignity is also 
described as the autonomy that is inherent in individuals’ right to self-
determination.273 
The concept of dignity has featured in parts of constitutional law. As 
other scholars have articulated, the Supreme Court has continuously 
recognized dignity as a central underpinning of the Eighth Amendment’s 
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.274 The Supreme Court notes 
that the Eighth Amendment protects “even those convicted of heinous 
crimes,” which “reaffirms the duty of the government to respect the dignity 
of all persons.”275 As Danielle C. Jefferis wrote, “Surely, the fundamental 
nature of dignity—recognized in all people, ‘even those convicted of 
heinous crimes’—applies with at least equal force to people in immigration 
confinement.”276 And further, surely the fundamental principle of dignity 
should apply to noncitizens in removal proceedings.277 
Moreover, the right against self-incrimination has been recognized as a 
manner of preserving the dignity of people accused of crimes. One scholar 
explained how the concept of dignity changed when the English courts 
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shifted the burden of proof from the defendant’s need to prove innocence to 
the prosecution’s duty to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt: “the 
dignity of defendants lay not in their ability to tell their stories fully, but 
rather in their ability to remain passive, to proclaim to the prosecutor, ‘Thou 
sayest,’ and to force the state to shoulder the entire load.”278 Thus, dignity 
is further supported by shifting the balance of power between the individual 
and the state. 
As a democracy that proclaims values such as fairness and justice, it is 
necessary to ensure that those values exist within our immigration system. 
Bolstering the right against self-incrimination serves to temper the extreme 
power differential and thereby furthers the goal of protecting human dignity 
as noncitizens move through immigration court processes.  
3. External Validation: Procedural Justice  
Procedural fairness is critical in removal proceedings because the stakes 
are high. As Justice Brandeis, speaking for the Court, stated, deportation 
deprives a person of liberty and “may result also in loss of both property 
and life; or of all that makes life worth living.”279 Even though deportation 
is not “punishment,” the consequences are still harsh, at times even harsher 
than criminal penalties. As a civil system with dire consequences, 
procedural protections should be as stringent in removal proceedings as they 
are in criminal court.  
Moreover, procedural justice calls for the right to meaningful 
participation in legal processes as an “essential prerequisite for the 
legitimate authority of action-guiding legal norms.”280 In other words, for 
the outcome of a legal matter to be considered legitimate by the participants 
in the case, as well as the larger society that observes the outcome, then the 
system must be regarded as having procedures that sufficiently allow the 
parties to seek enforcement, or defense of, their rights. Because litigants 
frequently may believe that the judgments against them are in error, 
litigants’ perception that the procedures were fair may enhance their view 
of the fairness of the system.281 
Additionally, from an enforcement perspective, social science data 
reveals that people’s perceptions of procedural fairness increases their 
perception that immigration policy is legitimate. 282 This held true in studies 
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concerning unlawful migration to the United States as well as the legal 
attitudes of detainees regarding their perceived obligation to obey 
immigration authorities. 283  Thus, increased protections afforded during 
removal proceedings, which in turn lead noncitizens to believe in the 
fairness of the process as a whole, may serve a deterrent effect in terms of 
noncompliance with immigration laws. 
B. Courts’ Current Deficiencies in Applying the Right 
A significant hurdle to fairness in removal proceedings is that there are 
insufficient mechanisms in place to address constitutional rights violations 
by law enforcement in removal proceedings because “immigration courts 
were not designed to police the police.”284 The fact that immigration courts 
are not designed to—and immigration judges do not believe they are 
empowered to—address constitutional wrongs creates fundamental 
problems in the system. Additionally, the busy dockets of immigration 
judges are often cited as a reason not to permit constitutional challenges. 
Nonetheless, immigration judges are trained and do presently rule on some 
constitutional issues, including the right against self-incrimination.285 And 
sacrificing due process and other constitutional rights because immigration 
judges have high caseloads should not be determinative. Rights should not 
be sacrificed in the name of efficiency where the stakes are high. 
There are several deficiencies in how courts are currently applying the 
right, which can be immediately remedied. First, alienage must be 
recognized for what it is—a link in the chain of evidence establishing that a 
crime was committed. As explained in Section III.B.1, alienage is an 
element of certain crimes and should be recognized as such. Thus, advocates 
should challenge attempts by the government or the immigration judge to 
force noncitizens to testify regarding alienage. After an objection is raised, 
the immigration judge would then have to consider whether there is a 
legitimate assertion of the right against self-incrimination. Where there is a 
legitimate assertion, and the government has no other proof of alienage, the 
government has failed to meet its burden and the immigration judge should 
terminate the removal proceedings.  
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Second, immigration judges need to recognize the discretion they have 
in whether to draw an adverse inference. A recent case exemplifies the 
discretion that judges have in this determination. In United States v. 
Charles, the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts 
recently considered the application of the right against self-incrimination in 
denaturalization proceedings.286 There, the court considered Ms. Charles’s 
repeated invocation of her right to remain silent in response to various 
discovery requests.287 On considering the government’s motion asking the 
court to draw adverse inferences with respect to Ms. Charles’s silence, the 
court declined to draw a negative inference after considering three facts: (1) 
the government had the burden of proving with clear, unequivocal, and 
convincing evidence that its allegations were true, (2) the stakes for Ms. 
Charles “are overwhelming,” and (3) the government was not “unduly 
disadvantaged” by Ms. Charles’s exercise of the Fifth Amendment because 
of the government’s ability to present testimony, exhibits, and Ms. Charles’s 
prior sworn statements.288 
A significant lesson for noncitizens in removal proceedings that emerges 
from this federal district court case is a reminder that the judge has 
discretion in deciding whether to draw an adverse inference.289 The factors 
listed by the Charles court are instructive, as similar factors may be in play 
during removal proceedings. The first factor demonstrates overall that 
burden of proof is a critical question not only in the strictest sense of 
determining whether silence is enough for the court to rule that the 
government has not met its burden of proof, but in determining whether it 
is fair to impose an adverse inference even where the government has 
introduced probative evidence. Second, the stakes in removal 
proceedings—as in denaturalization proceedings—are extremely high. 
Third, whether the government is in fact disadvantaged by an exercise of 
the Fifth Amendment is another consideration that should be weighed by 
immigration judges. Moreover, the Charles court cited to a First Circuit 
case, which states that “the Fifth Amendment privilege should be upheld 
unless defendants have substantial need for particular information and there 
is no other less burdensome effective means of obtaining it.”290 Requiring 
the government to demonstrate that it has no other less burdensome means 
to obtain information should also be weighed when the immigration judge 
is deciding whether an adverse inference is appropriate. 
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Third, the Charles case also shows that the door is open for lawful 
permanent residents (LPRs) in particular to make a compelling argument 
against adverse inferences. Just as in denaturalization matters, DHS has a 
heightened burden of proving that a noncitizen is deportable as charged.291 
In Woodby v. INS, the Supreme Court noted that the government had the 
burden to establish allegations in denaturalization as well as expatriation 
proceedings by “clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence.” 292  The 
Court further commented that, because many lawful permanent residents 
have lived in the United States longer than some U.S. citizens, “[t]he 
immediate hardship of deportation is often greater than that inflicted by 
denaturalization, which does not, immediately at least, result in expulsion 
from our shores.”293 Thus, the Court extended the “clear, unequivocal, and 
convincing evidence” standard to deportation proceedings.294 
Fourth, where the purpose of the right against self-incrimination is at 
least in part to prevent government overreach, it is contrary to that purpose 
to allow testimony given in civil immigration proceedings to later be 
admitted in criminal proceedings. Courts have held that questioning during 
immigration court is not reasonably likely to draw out incriminating 
statements. 295  Yet, there are certainly instances where statements made 
during immigration court are in fact the reason for a criminal prosecution.296 
This is a phenomenon that demonstrates how the right against self-
incrimination not applying in removal proceedings chips away at the right 
in the criminal context where it is fully deemed to apply. 
Fifth, a significant barrier to the exercise of these rights is the fact that 
the majority of noncitizens are pro se when they are before an immigration 
judge. Yet, for procedural—statutory, regulatory, or constitutional—
safeguards to be meaningful, noncitizens must have counsel. Representation 
by an attorney is not guaranteed in removal proceedings. 297  Rather, 
noncitizens have the “privilege” of hiring counsel at no expense to the 
government.298 And in fact, noncitizens are not represented by counsel in 
the vast majority of detained cases and a large number of non-detained 
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cases.299 While the presence of counsel does not guarantee fair proceedings, 
“[t]he lawyer places her skilled, trained voice between the state and her 
client, protects him from further revelations, reframes his case in the most 
legally advantageous terms, wields the law on his behalf, and generally 
makes the system work for him as far as the system permits.”300 Studies 
have shown that legal representation may drastically change not only the 
outcome of removal proceedings, but simply noncitizens’ pursuit of legal 
remedies available to them. For example, in one study, noncitizens who 
were not detained during their proceedings sought relief from removal in 
78% of cases with counsel versus only 15% without counsel.301 Indeed, 
detained noncitizens were twice as likely to win their cases if they had 
counsel, and non-detained noncitizens were nearly five times as likely to 
win their cases if they had counsel.302 
Particularly with respect to the right against self-incrimination, 
assistance of counsel is critical. As discussed in Section I.A.3, in order to 
invoke the right, the person must say so explicitly.303 A party must be aware 
of the availability of the right, its scope, and feel empowered to raise it. The 
rules around it are exceedingly complex. Parties can knowingly or 
unknowingly waive the right against self-incrimination if they voluntarily 
make incriminating statements.304 The right can also be waived if they fail 
to assert it in a timely manner.305 Furthermore, we cannot expect that the 
immigration judge, who as provided by regulation—as well as by 
circumstance where large numbers of noncitizens are unrepresented—has a 
partial role as an investigator,306 will assert the person’s right to remain 
silent for them. Thus, there is an inherent conflict in the role of the 
immigration judge that requires that counsel be present. 
A final consideration is that, particularly without the assistance of 
counsel as occurs in many cases, cultural norms regarding interactions with 
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authority figures may also affect a noncitizen’s willingness to exercise 
certain rights such as the right to remain silent, whether in interrogations or 
during court proceedings.307 Noncitizens may also feel like they must speak 
because of the dynamics of the interrogation or courtroom. Thus, it is 
imperative that people in removal proceedings be advised of and feel 
empowered to exercise their constitutional rights. 
V. PROPOSED REGULATORY AMENDMENT 
A. Preliminary Considerations 
On considering how to address the immigrant enforcement and 
adjudication systems’ current deficiencies with respect to the Self-
Incrimination Clause, certain challenges—namely, the crushing caseload of 
immigration judges and the low rate of appeals—must be taken into 
account. These challenges highlight that, rather than relying on the 
appropriate development of case law, new agency regulations are the best 
approach to effect necessary change in protecting noncitizens’ rights in 
removal proceedings. 
The first hurdle to developing law in the immigration court context is the 
high caseload of immigration judges. Because there were 442 immigration 
judges carrying a pending caseload of 987,000 matters at the end of fiscal 
year 2019, we can estimate that each judge carried a load of approximately 
2,233 cases each. 308  Moreover, as of 2018, the DOJ imposed a case 
completion quota of 700 cases per year on immigration judges.309  The 
combination of quotas and oversized dockets forces immigration judges to 
get rid of cases as quickly as possible, which increases the likelihood that 
mistakes will be made and that noncitizens will not receive due process, 
including that they will not be given opportunities to raise and have 
constitutional issues adjudicated in immigration court. Furthermore, in a 
hearing by the House Subcommittee on Immigration and Citizenship, it was 
 
307. See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 460 (1994) (“We recognize that requiring a clear 
assertion of the right to counsel might disadvantage some suspects who—because of fear, intimidation, 
lack of linguistic skills, or a variety of other reasons—will not clearly articulate their right to counsel 
although they actually want to have a lawyer present.”); Adam G. Finger, Note, How Do You Get A 
Lawyer Around Here? The Ambiguous Invocation of a Defendant’s Right to Counsel Under Miranda v. 
Arizona, 79 MARQ. L. REV. 1041, 1060–61 (1996) (discussing how factors such as cultural background, 
gender, and race disadvantage some from articulating their right to counsel).  
308. EOIR Case Numbers, supra note 18. 
309. The head of the immigration judges’ union spoke out against the imposition of quotas, calling 
the quotas the beginning of a “new and dark era” and restating the union’s position that Congress should 
remove the immigration court from the Department of Justice. Yeganeh Torbati, Head of U.S. 
Immigration Judges’ Union Denounces Trump Quota Plan, REUTERS (Sept. 21, 2018, 3:04 PM), https:// 
www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-immigration-judges/head-of-u-s-immigration-judges-union-denounces 
-trump-quota-plan-idUSKCN1M12LZ [https://perma.cc/5WAF-JP5S].  











pointed out that EOIR has been hiring immigration judges who do not have 
any immigration experience,310 an obvious impediment to expeditious and 
correct resolution of complex issues involving the intersection of 
constitutional and immigration law. 
A second hurdle is the low rate of appeals, which is likely related to the 
dismal rates of representation by counsel.311 Immigration courts are bound 
to follow legal precedent set by the Board of Immigration Appeals, the 
federal circuit in which each court sits, and the Supreme Court of the United 
States.312 While it may appear that there are significant opportunities for 
judicial review of the decision made by immigration courts and the BIA, the 
opposite is true. First, the federal courts are limited to reviewing only 
“constitutional claims or questions of law.”313 Second, the vast majority of 
cases are resolved at the immigration court level and are never appealed. 
From fiscal years 2014–2017, only 9–11% of cases were appealed, and the 
number slightly increased to 17% in 2018.314 Far fewer are appealed to the 
federal circuit courts. 315  Thus, any legal errors committed by the 
immigration courts are very unlikely to be corrected through the appellate 
process. 
Thus, in recognition of the challenges of addressing individual 
constitutional rights through the court system, this Article proposes the 
implementation of a new section to the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). 
The CFR reflects the agency’s interpretation of the federal immigration 
statute, the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). So long as the agencies 
are not exceeding power granted to them by Congress through the INA, the 
immigration agencies have discretion in determining how to carry out their 
day-to-day operations by creating regulations. 316  When proposing new 
rules, agencies post a “Notice of Proposed Rulemaking” in the Federal 
 
310. Nolan Rappaport, Opinion, No Experience Required: US Hiring Immigration Judges Who 
Don’t Have Any Immigration Law Experience, THE HILL (Feb. 3, 2020, 11:30 AM), https://thehill.com/o 
pinion/immigration/481152-us-hiring-immigration-judges-who-dont-have-any-immigration-law-experi 
ence [https://perma.cc/5SYG-YZDR]. 
311. See supra note 299. 
312. Matter of E-L-H-, 23 I&N Dec. 814, 815 (BIA 2005) (“[A] Board precedent decision applies 
to all proceedings involving the same issue unless and until it is modified or overruled by the Attorney 
General, the Board, Congress, or a Federal court.”); see also Ballesteros v. Ashcroft, 452 F.3d 1153, 
1157 (10th Cir. 2006) (citing Latu v. Ashcroft, 375 F.3d 1012, 1019 (10th Cir. 2004), adhered to in part 
on reh’g sub nom. Ballesteros v. Gonzales, 482 F.3d 1205 (10th Cir. 2007)). 
313. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D). 
314. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., EXEC. OFF. FOR IMMIGR. REV., STATISTICS YEARBOOK: FISCAL YEAR 
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Register and will set a notice-and-comment period for members of the 
public to weigh in on the proposed rule.317  
First are a set of principles outlining the problems that should be fixed, 
followed by proposed additions to the regulations. The overall goal of this 
proposed solution is procedural fairness. Recognizing that a variety of 
actors, not just courts, must assess how the right against self-incrimination 
is applied, the following are proposals regarding how to handle various 
situations. 
B. Proposed Regulations and Explanations 
Now we turn to the proposed regulations. These could be inserted as a 
complete section into the existing regulations, perhaps as a new § 1003.48 
in the Executive Office for Immigration Review’s 8 C.F.R. § 1003 Subpart 
C (Immigration Court—Rules of Procedure).  
Following the proposed language are explanations of the underlying 
principles, which are intended to ensure procedural fairness. 
The Respondent’s Right to Silence.318 
(a) Initial immigration judge advisals. At the first master calendar 
hearing, the immigration judge shall ensure that the respondent has 
been advised of their right not to make a statement regarding alienage 
or criminal activity, and that any statement made may be used against 
the respondent. The immigration judge must also advise that an 
adverse inference may be drawn in certain circumstances, which shall 
be explained with specificity to the respondent if the issue arises in 
accordance with subsection (f).  
(b) Duty to advise prior to taking of testimony. In any hearing in 
which testimony will be taken, the immigration judge shall first 
remind the respondent of their right to silence. 
 
317. OFF. OF THE FED. REG., A GUIDE TO THE RULEMAKING PROCESS (2011), https://www.federal 
register.gov/uploads/2011/01/the_rulemaking_process.pdf [https://perma.cc/3QTS-7BK6].  
318. First, a note about terminology. The current regulatory framework uses the word “alien” 
throughout. See generally 8 C.F.R. § 1003. However, “alien” has been criticized for its dehumanizing 
impact. See, e.g., Kevin R. Johnson, “Aliens” and the U.S. Immigration Laws: The Social and Legal 
Construction of Nonpersons, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 263, 272–73 (1997) (“In effect, the term 
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administration has ordered U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement and U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection to stop using the phrase “illegal alien.” Maria Sacchetti, ICE, CBP to Stop Using “Illegal 
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0M5SDdcim9bNTJuEatT1OLZA [https://perma.cc/4RDY-GRJF]. Thus, this proposed section uses the 
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(c) Pending criminal proceedings. Where the respondent provides 
proof that they have a pending criminal case, or that a criminal case 
is otherwise unresolved such as where post-conviction relief is being 
sought or the matter is on appeal, the respondent may choose not to 
testify regarding the underlying conduct relating to the criminal 
charges. If the respondent chooses to remain silent, the immigration 
judge is prohibited from compelling the respondent to speak, and 
further is prohibited from drawing an adverse inference. 
(d) Burdens of proof. Where the government bears the burden of 
proof, the respondent’s own testimony may not be taken until the 
government has provided prima facie evidence. On the government’s 
presentation of such evidence, an immigration judge may draw an 
adverse inference if the respondent chooses to remain silent.319  
(e) Motions to compel. After a respondent exercises the right to 
silence, an immigration judge may not compel the respondent to 
speak. Rather, on a motion by the government, an immigration judge 
can request that the United States Attorney report the respondent’s 
refusal to testify to a federal district court and request an order 
compelling the respondent to do so. 
(f) Statutory or regulatory violations by immigration officers. 
Where an immigration judge finds that immigration officers violated 
statutory or regulatory duties and documents or other information 
were obtained, such documents or other information obtained as a 
result of the violation shall not be considered to be prima facie 
evidence triggering the respondent’s need to present rebuttal 
evidence or testimony. 
(g) Adverse inferences. When a respondent, or their counsel, raises 
the right against self-incrimination, and DHS has first submitted 
evidence, the immigration judge shall state with specificity the 
adverse inference to be drawn, as well as the weight that will be given 
to the adverse inference, if the respondent chooses to remain silent. 
This proposed regulatory framework is poised to address several 
problems. A significant barrier to exercise of the right against self-
incrimination is that people in removal proceedings may not be aware of the 
right, and even if they are aware of it, may not know how to properly 
exercise it without the assistance of counsel. Courts have held explicitly that 
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there is no right to Miranda-like warnings in removal proceedings.320 The 
language of the proposed regulation here mirrors the mandatory advisals for 
initial appearances that are required by the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. 321  Thus, these regulations guarantee that all respondents in 
proceedings are informed about this constitutional right, regardless of 
whether they have an attorney.  
Moreover, the regulations seek to clarify the murkiness surrounding 
adverse inferences. The threat of an adverse inference can have the same 
effect as an order to compel. Currently, the immigration judge may not draw 
an adverse inference if a noncitizen chooses to remain silent and the 
government has not first provided probative evidence. However, that 
protection does not go far enough due to the large numbers of noncitizens 
who go unrepresented in immigration court. Accordingly, noncitizens 
should be supplied with all information necessary to decide whether to 
remain silent, and the proposed regulations therefore provide that 
immigration judges should have to advise the noncitizen regarding the 
adverse inference to be drawn.  
The proposed regulations also aim to lessen the environment of coercion 
created by extreme power imbalances in the courtroom. The right against 
self-incrimination cannot be effective in criminal proceedings if noncitizens 
are compelled to speak or even feel compelled to speak because of the threat 
of an adverse inference in their removal proceedings. Additionally, there is 
a threat of harm that the Fifth Amendment is designed to protect against 
where a noncitizen has currently pending criminal proceedings, or their 
matter is up on appeal. Thus, the proposed regulations provide that the 
immigration judge is prohibited from drawing an adverse inference if the 
noncitizen wishes to remain silent where there is a pending or otherwise 
unresolved criminal matter.  
Moreover, these regulations seek to slightly correct the massive power 
imbalance between the government and noncitizens. This Article proposes 
a new rule that the noncitizen’s testimony simply may not be taken at all 
until the government has provided prima facie evidence. Thus, where the 
government bears the burden of proof, such as in establishing alienage and 
proving removability, the government should not be able to rely solely on 
the noncitizen’s testimony to meet its burden. This proposed regulation is 
in line with Judge Posner’s argument that the economic benefit of the self-
incrimination rule is that, by forcing the government to bear the burden of 
production, frivolous or harassing use of the courts can be avoided.322 
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Perhaps an obvious, but not always applied, principle is that documents 
on which the government relies should be reliable and the information 
therein should have been legitimately obtained. Statutory and regulatory 
violations by immigration officers occur frequently and it is time that 
immigration courts stop rewarding such conduct. Accordingly, such 
documents may not be relied on for purposes of prima facie evidence of the 
issue the government is trying to prove (for purposes of the right against 
self-incrimination), even if the immigration judge finds that suppression of 
the document is not warranted. 
Other possible language is to say: “such documents or information 
obtained as a result of the violation shall not be admitted as evidence.” 
However, phrasing the statutory-violation regulation in that way would 
fundamentally change the current standard of admissible evidence in 
immigration court and is beyond the scope of this Article.323 Rather, the 
purpose here is to say that regulatory or statutory violations by immigration 
officers should mean that such documents or information cannot constitute 
evidence that then shifts the burden to the noncitizen to speak.  
Lastly, there is a question of whether immigration judges should be 
permitted to compel someone to speak if the person has legitimately 
asserted their right against self-incrimination, because immigration judges 
are not adequately equipped to rule on substantive constitutional issues that 
may expose noncitizens to criminal prosecution. The Immigration Judge 
Benchbook covers the right against self-incrimination in about three 
pages. 324  As Jennifer M. Chacón has posited, there are insufficient 
mechanisms in place to address constitutional rights violations—in part, by 
law enforcement—in removal proceedings because “immigration courts 
were not designed to police the police,” 325  which leads to incorrect 
decisions regarding constitutional rights. Moreover, as discussed supra, 
immigration judges are charged with the role of “investigator,” particularly 
where there the respondent lacks representation by an attorney, and there is 
an inherent conflict of interest where the judge is both investigator and 
ultimate adjudicator.326  
A solution that has been proposed by scholar Daniel Kanstroom is to 
require the government to file a motion to compel in federal court if they 
wish to eliminate someone’s right to remain silent. The existing regulations 
provide that, as part of an immigration judge’s subpoena power, they can 
request that the United States Attorney report the witness’s refusal to a 
 
323. The author intends to address the issue of suppression of evidence, and the extent to which 
the Fourth Amendment applies in immigration removal proceedings, in future scholarship. 
324. See IMMIGRATION JUDGE BENCHBOOK, supra note 189, at 20–26.  
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federal district court and seek an order requiring the witnesses to comply 
with the subpoena in immigration court.327 Thus, this procedure is already 
somewhat delineated in the regulations. If the government is forced to file 
a motion to compel in federal district court, then the district court judge 
would review immigration officials’ conduct and also consider whether the 
testimony should be compelled or not.328 The benefits of this approach are 
twofold: (1) the district court adds an additional layer of oversight regarding 
the propriety of ICE officers’ conduct, and (2) it avoids the problem where 
the immigration judge, who is ultimately deciding the outcome of the case, 
may discover too much before determining that the person cannot be 
compelled to speak.329  
C. Responses to Potential Criticisms 
There are a few potential criticisms that could be raised regarding the 
approach recommended by this Article. One is that the rationales for—and 
even the utility of—the right against self-incrimination are subject to debate 
in the criminal context. Even for those who do believe that the right against 
self-incrimination is an important procedural right, some may argue that 
regulations are not the correct solution. These critiques, while deserving of 
consideration, do not outweigh the benefits of the approach prescribed here.  
By its proponents, the right against self-incrimination is regarded as a 
fundamental tenet of American law. There are numerous movie and 
television show references to the “right to remain silent” and it is commonly 
known that a witness on the stand is permitted to refuse to speak if they 
“plead the Fifth”; thus, the right certainly appears central to our rights as 
people who live in the United States. 330  On the other hand, the Self-
Incrimination Clause has been criticized as an outdated concept that 
obscures the truth.331 Some scholars have called for the outright abolition of 
the right, or at least for the imposition of strict limits to it.332 Still others say 
that the privilege was intended for narrower interpretation than currently 
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LeFevre, 758 F.2d 866, 875 (2d Cir. 1985)). 




331. HELMHOLZ ET AL., supra note 32, at 3.  
332. Id.; see also Alschuler, supra note 4, at 2634. 











afforded, as it was incorporated into the Constitution simply to prohibit 
specific undesirable methods of interrogation such as torture.333 
Despite these criticisms, there is support for the fact that the right against 
self-incrimination serves critical functions and could assist substantially in 
protecting noncitizens’ rights in immigration court. It assists in preventing 
government overreach, protecting individuals’ dignity, and enhancing 
procedural justice, as laid out supra in Section IV.A. More practically 
speaking, as in the criminal setting, there is utility in remaining silent where 
the government bears the burden of proof.334 There is also recognition that 
because criminal defendants are facing prosecution by an adversarial system 
with “high conviction rates and heavy punishments,” the right against self-
incrimination is a fundamental protection.335 These same protections are 
warranted for noncitizens in removal proceedings for similar reasons: 
highly adversarial proceedings, high rates of government success, and an 
imbalance of power between the government and the noncitizen.  
Another criticism worthy of consideration is that there is some 
speculation about whether the “right to remain silent” is actually in full 
effect in criminal law either. About 97% of federal cases and 94% of state 
criminal trials end with a guilty plea—an absolute admission of guilt.336 
Such statistics reflect a significant phenomenon; despite the Constitution’s 
stated commitment to not forcing defendants to self-incriminate, “[f]ew 
other nations are as dependent as ours on proving guilt from a defendant’s 
own mouth.”337 Thus, the idea that the system is “adversarial” is perhaps a 
shrinking reality, instead being replaced by an administrative process where 
prosecutorial discretion reigns. 338  Nevertheless, the right against self-
incrimination continues to play an important role in cases where the accused 
decides to proceed to trial, and it is therefore critical that the right be 
preserved. Furthermore, the noncitizen should ultimately be the one 
empowered to decide, in a meaningfully informed manner, whether or not 
to testify. 
Immigrant advocates may also argue that litigation is the best way 
forward. However, as we have seen with other immigrants’ rights issues, 
litigation often leads to piecemeal victories that do not apply nationwide. 
Moreover, with the makeup of the Supreme Court as it stands, decisions 
bolstering such constitutional rights of noncitizens seem unlikely. 
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Procedural protections must be available immediately to the approximately 
one million people who are currently in the immigration enforcement 
system. Thus, this proposed regulatory solution is preferable. 
CONCLUSION 
Although courts still consider immigration enforcement—including 
apprehension, detention, and removal proceedings—to be a civil system, 
there is an increasing overlap between criminal and immigration law. The 
expansion of immigration incarceration, particularly prolonged detention, 
increasing penalties for interactions with the criminal justice system (not 
limited to convictions), and aggressive criminal prosecution of immigration 
law violations necessitate examining the system with fresh eyes. Even the 
Supreme Court has recognized that deportation is becoming an ever more 
common penalty for criminal conduct.  
The lack of adequate procedural protections, including misapplication of 
the right against self-incrimination, bears important consequences in 
immigration court. The scope of the Self-Incrimination Clause should be 
recognized such that current protections are correctly enforced in protecting 
noncitizens’ constitutional rights. Additionally, new regulations could go a 
long way in clarifying those rights and slightly expanding the right against 
self-incrimination to more closely match the protection afforded in criminal 
court, in recognition of the quasi-criminal aspects of the immigration 
enforcement scheme. Of course, this Article imagines that we continue in 
the current reality of immigration being viewed as a civil system. If removal 
proceedings are one day recognized as being at least quasi-criminal, the 
application of the right against self-incrimination would expand, and some 
of the regulations proposed here would likely become redundant. 
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